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BOOK REVIEW 
THE BLACK POLICE: POLICING OUR OWN 
 
LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK 
AMERICA.  By James Forman Jr.  New York, N.Y.: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux.  2017.  Pp. 306.  $27.00. 
Reviewed by Devon W. Carbado∗ & L. Song Richardson∗∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Since Darren Wilson shot and killed Michael Brown in 2014,1 the 
problem of police violence against African Americans has been a rela-
tively salient feature of nationwide discussions about race.  Across the 
ideological spectrum, people have had to engage the question of whether, 
especially in the context of policing, it’s fair to say that black lives are 
undervalued.  While there is both a racial and a political divide with 
respect to how Americans have thus far answered that question, the 
emergence of Black Lives Matter movements2 has made it virtually im-
possible to be a bystander in the debate. 
Separate from whether racialized policing against African Americans 
is, in fact, a social phenomenon, is the contestable question about solu-
tions: Assuming that African Americans are indeed the victims of over-
policing, meaning that by some metric they end up having more inter-
actions with the police and more violent encounters than is normatively 
warranted, what can we do about it?  And here, the answers range from 
abolishing police officers altogether, to training them, to diversifying po-
lice departments.  It is on the last of these proposed solutions — the 
diversification of police departments — that we focus in this essay.  The 
central question we ask is: What are the dynamics that might shape how 
African American police officers police other African Americans?  Asked 
another way, what do existing theories about race and race relations, 
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and historical and empirical studies on race and policing, suggest about 
how African Americans will police our own? 
Our point of departure is a review of Professor James Forman’s 
Locking Up Our Own.  Though not framed in precisely this way,  
Forman’s book is, in many ways, about the relationship between diver-
sity and governance.  Forman is particularly interested in the role  
African Americans have played across different sites of governance — 
as city council members, mayors, governors, prosecutors, police offi- 
cers — in facilitating and legitimizing the mass incarceration of African 
Americans.  The story he tells is largely a story about choices under 
constraints — but choices that produced consequences for which  
African Americans bear some, though not the bulk, of the responsibility.  
Which is to say, Forman is clear to describe how African American lead-
ers contributed to and participated in the war on drugs, clear to empha-
size that many of those leaders had unsuccessfully advocated for  
interventions, even beyond criminal justice–oriented or law enforcement–
oriented ones, to address the growing drug epidemic in African  
American communities, and clear to highlight the broader racial and 
political context in which African American leaders acted. 
Some might deploy Forman’s book to advance the proposition that 
race has played less of a role in the mass incarceration of African  
Americans than liberals and progressives like to admit.  After all, black 
people have been agents, and not just victims, of mass incarceration.  
Our own view is that Forman’s thesis is more nuanced than the preced-
ing account suggests.  Forman’s focus on African American governance 
is a way of complicating our understanding of how race has mattered in 
the mass incarceration of African Americans.  His analysis of African 
American decisionmaking across various domains of the criminal justice 
apparatus reminds us that the persistence of racial inequality in the 
United States derives from problems of power and structure, rather than 
simply individual choice and identity. 
To recognize the existence of power is not to deny the possibility of 
agency or the space African American leaders might have had to exer-
cise at least some meaningful control over their choices.  The point is 
rather that the phenomenon of African Americans exercising govern-
ance does not eliminate the racial barriers to combating racial inequality.  
If the two-term presidency of Barack Obama teaches us anything on 
this issue, it is that the racial identity of a leader — even a President of 
the United States — is not enough to dismantle or meaningfully mitigate 
the racial inequality of a society.  Does this mean liberals and progres-
sives are wrong to argue for racial diversity?  No.  It means that if racial 
diversity is the only game in town we are in civil rights trouble.  That, 
we think, is one of the most important lessons to be drawn from  
Forman’s book: racial diversity without meaningful reallocations or re-
distributions of power might not only limit the possibilities for social 
transformation but also potentially reproduce and legitimize the very 
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forms of inequality the pursuit of racial diversity was intended to ad-
dress.  At least implicitly, Forman advances that insight with respect to 
the mass incarceration of African Americans.  Our focus is on a slice of 
that criminal justice problem — policing. 
Specifically, drawing on empirical, historical, and theoretical litera-
tures, we examine how, if at all, black police officers’ race might shape 
how they police other African Americans.  Fundamental to our ap-
proach is a Du Boisian conceptualization of race and professional iden-
tity — namely, that African American police officers have to negotiate 
and reconcile two historically distinct strivings — the strivings to be 
“blue” and the strivings to be “black” — in one “dark body.”3  As we will 
explain, how they perform that negotiation and reconciliation is not 
simply a matter of individual choice, individual agency, and individual 
commitment.  Structural factors are at play as well, in much the same 
way that structural factors shaped, though certainly did not fully deter-
mine, how the black leaders Forman describes mobilized various dimen-
sions of the criminal justice apparatus to address the proliferation of 
crime and drug usage in African American communities. 
The remainder of the essay proceeds as follows.  Part I summarizes 
Forman’s book, paying particular attention to where in Forman’s ac-
count he focuses on individual agency and where he pays closer atten-
tion to structure.  Part II builds on that summary to discuss the black 
police.  Part of our aim here is to show that the very factors — including 
Fourth Amendment law, explicit and implicit biases,4 and racial anxi-
ety5 — that explain why white police officers might systematically over-
police and deploy violence against African Americans arguably impli-
cate black police officers as well.  Moreover, the pressures black police 
officers likely experience to fit into their departments potentially com-
pound the problem.  Some black officers may believe that their failure 
to share and display fellow officers’ racial assumptions about African 
Americans will engender the perception that black officers are “soft” on 
crime and criminality and “hard” on racial affiliation and loyalty.  That 
perception would create an incentive for black officers to “work their 
identities”6 to disconfirm assumptions that they will insufficiently iden-
tify with being “blue”7 and overly identify with being “black.”  Overpo-
licing other African Americans would be one way for black officers to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 3 W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 45 (Signet Classic 1969) (1903). 
 4 See L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 
2035, 2038–39 (2011). 
 5 See Rachel D. Godsil & L. Song Richardson, Racial Anxiety, 102 IOWA L. REV. 2235, 2237 
(2017) (defining the concept of “racial anxiety” in the context of interracial relations). 
 6 On the theory of working identity, or intentionally signaling certain traits or identities, see 
Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000).  
 7 See, e.g., Jerome H. Skolnick, Corruption and the Blue Code of Silence, 3 POLICE PRAC. & 
RES. 7, 7 (2002) (describing the idea of an internal code of loyalty among police officers that can 
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perform that work.8  We conclude by suggesting that just as the pursuit 
of diversity in the context of higher education has not eradicated the 
racial dimensions of educational inequality, the pursuit of diversity in 
the context of policing will not, without more, fundamentally change 
how African Americans experience the police.9 
I.  LOCKING UP OUR OWN 
 In his groundbreaking and insightful book, Forman traces how the 
incremental decisions made by African Americans as “citizens, voters, 
mayors, legislators, prosecutors, police officers, . . . and community ac-
tivists” in Washington, D.C., over a forty-year period shaped criminal 
justice policy and contributed to the mass incarceration of African 
Americans (p. 10).  To understand how and why African Americans par-
ticipated in the “punishment binge” (p. 10), Forman foregrounds two 
issues: the desire of African Americans to protect black lives from the 
surge in violence and crime ravaging their communities during the 1960s 
and beyond (pp. 10, 217–18), and the role racism played in limiting their 
options to do so (pp. 11–13).  The African Americans he highlights in 
the book always intended to address the root causes of crime, including 
education and employment (pp. 11–12, 64, 76–77).  The tough-on-crime 
responses were simply an expedient and readily available means of tack-
ling the devastating effects of crime and violence in the short term.  
However, “the incremental and diffuse way the war on crime was waged 
made it difficult for some African American leaders to appreciate the 
impact of the choices they were making” (p. 13).  Over decades, their 
decisions helped to create a criminal justice system that became grossly 
more punitive for indigent African Americans (p. 14), while the social 
programs they envisioned never came to fruition.  In sum, Forman’s 
account recognizes how “racism’s enduring role” constrained not only 
African Americans’ options at the front end but also the possibilities at 
the back end (p. 12).  Thus, despite his focus on the role of African 
Americans, Forman cautions against “minimiz[ing] the role of whites or 
of racism in the development of mass incarceration” (p. 11). 
 Were we to offer any overarching criticisms of Forman’s book, we 
would note two limitations to his analysis.  First, Forman could have 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
have both beneficial and harmful effects); Louise Westmarland, Police Ethics and Integrity: Break-
ing the Blue Code of Silence, 15 POLICING & SOC’Y 145, 155–57 (2005) (explaining how survey 
results support the existence of an informal police code of conduct). 
 8 Cf. Devon W. Carbado & Patrick Rock, What Exposes African Americans to Police Violence?, 
51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 163–65 (2016) (delineating the systemic factors leading to overpo-
licing of African Americans). 
 9 See Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing Black People: The Fourth 
Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 127–28 (2017) (discussing the 
multiple ways in which African Americans are exposed to police contact and violence). 
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done more, quite a bit more, to highlight that his book is not first and 
foremost about black agency and social responsibility.  As we have al-
ready said and want to emphasize again here, Forman unequivocally 
states that his book means to take seriously the structural conditions 
under which black decisionmakers promulgated policy and governed.  
However, Forman’s near-exclusive focus on what these actors did, with 
scant attention to the conditions under which they acted, leaves readers 
with the daunting challenge of articulating those structural factors for 
themselves.10  
Second, Forman’s analysis does not engage with or evidence a nor-
mative sensibility about intersectionality.11  Which is to say, for the most 
part, throughout Forman’s book, men figure as the racial subjects of the 
war on drugs and mass incarceration.  The centralization of men in this 
way elides the particularities of black women’s experiences across sexual 
orientation and gender/sexual identity.  Significantly, in naming this in-
tersectional shortfall we are not simply advancing an argument about 
inclusion and exclusion — that is, that excluding black women from the 
analysis further obscures their experiences under “the new Jim Crow”12 
and compounds the difficulty advocates continue to have including 
black women’s voices in antiracist contestations of criminal justice.  Our 
point is rather that, as black feminists such as Professors Kimberlé  
Crenshaw, Priscilla Ocen, and Andrea Ritchie have noted,13 an engage-
ment of black women’s experiences with policing, state violence, and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 10 See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Who Locked Us Up? Examining the Social Meaning of Black 
Punitiveness, 127 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (reviewing JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP 
OUR OWN (2017)) (expressing concern that readers might interpret Forman’s argument as a critique 
of or challenge to antiracist contestations of the criminal justice system). 
 11 For a definition of intersectionality, see Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection 
of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and 
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 149; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: 
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 
1242–44 (1991); and see also Devon W. Carbado, Colorblind Intersectionality, 38 SIGNS 811, 845 
(2013). 
 12 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE 
OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012). 
 13 See generally JOEY L. MOGUL, ANDREA J. RITCHIE & KAY WHITLOCK, QUEER (IN)JUS-
TICE: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF LGBT PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES (2011); ANDREA J. 
RITCHIE, INVISIBLE NO MORE: POLICE VIOLENCE AGAINST BLACK WOMEN AND WOMEN 
OF COLOR (2017); Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, From Private Violence to Mass Incarceration: Thinking 
Intersectionally About Women, Race, and Social Control, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1418 (2012); Priscilla 
A. Ocen, Punishing Pregnancy: Race, Incarceration, and the Shackling of Pregnant Prisoners, 100 
CALIF. L. REV. 1239, 1312 (2012); Priscilla A. Ocen, The New Racially Restrictive Covenant: Race, 
Welfare, and the Policing of Black Women in Subsidized Housing, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1540, 1583 
(2012); KIMBERLÉ WILLIAMS CRENSHAW & ANDREA J. RITCHIE WITH RACHEL ANSPACH 
ET AL., AFRICAN AM. POLICY FORUM & CTR. FOR INTERSECTIONALITY & SOC. POLICY 
STUDIES, COLUMBIA LAW SCH., SAY HER NAME: RESISTING POLICE BRUTALITY AGAINST 
BLACK WOMEN (2015), http://www.aapf.org/sayhernamereport/ [https://perma.cc/FF44-NYZZ].  
Of course, there is a broader literature that highlights how black women experience the criminal 
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incarceration puts into sharp relief otherwise hidden racialized dimen-
sions of the criminal justice system, particularly how that system collab-
orates with and expresses itself through various parts of the welfare 
state.14  We should be clear to say that we will not, in the remainder of 
this essay, elaborate on the preceding two criticisms because we do not 
mean for them to overshadow what we perceive to be the central con-
tribution of Locking Up Our Own — a heretofore largely unarticulated 
story of how black leaders participated in and negotiated their relation-
ship to regimes of crime and punishment.  What we will do instead, 
then, in the rest of this Part, is summarize Forman’s book, pausing in 
places to mark its important interventions and the careful archival re-
search that enabled them.   
In Part I of Locking Up Our Own, Forman describes the origins of 
the tough-on-crime stance taken by many African Americans during the 
period from 1975 through 1978 in Washington, D.C.  He explains that 
many black religious, government, political, and community leaders ral-
lied against marijuana decriminalization and advocated for harsher gun 
regulations because of their overriding concern to protect black lives 
from the scourge of drugs and violence decimating their communities 
(pp. 43–46, 51–57).  With the benefit of hindsight, it seems inconceivable 
that African American leaders would advocate against marijuana de-
criminalization and for increased penalties for gun-related crimes given 
the contributions both have made to the mass incarceration of black 
civilians.  Yet, by highlighting the broader context and constraints under 
which these decisions were made, Forman makes sense of these deci-
sions.  “In both cases, elected officials and other community leaders iden-
tified an issue plaguing the community, focused on its racial dimensions, 
and led a political response that emphasized prohibition” (p. 75). 
When marijuana decriminalization was proposed in Washington, 
D.C., the black community was still reeling from the devastating effects 
of the heroin epidemic.  Many black leaders worried that decriminaliza-
tion would keep drugs in their communities and encourage drug use, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
justice system.  See generally, e.g., ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ANGELA DAVIS: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 
(1988); ANGELA Y. DAVIS, FREEDOM IS A CONSTANT STRUGGLE: FERGUSON, PALESTINE, 
AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF A MOVEMENT (2016); ANGELA Y. DAVIS, THE MEANING OF 
FREEDOM (2012); BETH E. RICHIE, ARRESTED JUSTICE: BLACK WOMEN, VIOLENCE, AND 
AMERICA’S PRISON NATION (2012); BETH E. RICHIE, COMPELLED TO CRIME: THE GENDER 
ENTRAPMENT OF BATTERED BLACK WOMEN (1996); INSIDE THIS PLACE, NOT OF IT: NAR-
RATIVES FROM WOMEN’S PRISONS (Robin Levi & Ayelet Waldman eds., 2011); PAULA C.  
JOHNSON, INNER LIVES: VOICES OF AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN IN PRISON 4–6 (2003); 
Kim Shayo Buchanan, Impunity: Sexual Abuse in Women’s Prisons, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
45 (2007); Natalie J. Sokoloff, The Effect of the Prison-Industrial Complex on African American 
Women, in RACIALIZING JUSTICE, DISENFRANCHISING LIVES: THE RACISM, CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE, AND LAW READER 73 (Manning Marable et al. eds., 2007); Julia Sudbury, Women of Color, 
Globalization and the Politics of Incarceration, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND 
WOMEN 219 (Barbara Raffel Price & Natalie J. Sokoloff eds., 3d ed. 2004). 
 14 See Carbado, supra note 9, at 164 (framing this phenomenon as part of a broader problem of 
mass criminalization).  
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leading to more “crime . . . and degradation” (p. 33).  Forman relates 
that many leaders operated on the assumption that criminal punishment 
would drive drugs and the dealers who sold them out of the community 
(pp. 31–32).  Furthermore, some were suspicious that whites wanted to 
encourage drug use amongst blacks in order to keep them passive (pp. 
35–37).  In their view, decriminalization would primarily help white in-
dividuals, who could bounce back from addiction to lead productive 
lives, whereas racism would prevent blacks from ever overcoming the 
effects (pp. 37–39).  The black leaders who opposed decriminalization, 
many of whom were seen as “guardians of the black community” and 
“were among the black community’s most dogged defenders” (p. 44), did 
not foresee the impact their decision to oppose decriminalization would 
have on the very black lives they were trying to save (p. 45), especially 
because at the time, most people who were arrested for drug crimes were 
neither convicted nor incarcerated (p. 45). 
Forman explains that Washington, D.C.’s gun control movement 
was also animated by concerns over protecting black lives.  In the 1970s 
and 1980s, some black leaders sought an expedient solution to the mas-
sive increase in violent gun-related crimes destroying their communities 
(pp. 54–57).  Their goals were twofold: to protect black communities 
from the ravages of guns and to rid the community of the small group 
of criminals who were terrorizing it (p. 61).  To do so, black leaders 
advocated stricter gun laws and more punitive sentences, including 
mandatory minimums (pp. 56, 60–61).  While they acknowledged that 
blacks would bear the brunt of these law enforcement responses, they 
believed it was necessary to pay this price in order to rid neighborhoods 
of the criminals limiting the communities’ economic viability, safety, and 
social mobility (p. 61).  Black supporters of gun control “insisted that 
they had not abandoned the struggle against inequality and racial injus-
tice” (p. 63).  Rather, gun control was a useful first step (p. 63).  Forman 
explains that while there was a century-old tradition of gun ownership 
within the black community to protect against the tyranny of white vi-
olence (pp. 64–73), the salient problem facing black communities was 
not racial “genocide” but rather “racial suicide” (p. 73).  In the end, “by 
a 12–1 vote, Washington, D.C., passed one of the nation’s strictest gun 
control laws” (p. 71). 
As we see today, the irony of these decisions is that neither marijuana 
criminalization, nor gun control, nor more punitive sentences curbed 
crime and violence in black and brown communities.  Instead, homicide 
rates and drug crime continued to rise while those falling victim to in-
creased penalties and imprisonment were primarily black and brown 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3184015
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(pp. 77, 143).15  Black supporters of the aforementioned three responses 
did not envision that their short-term calls for law enforcement solutions 
to crime and violence would become the sole response, while the long-
term solution of addressing the social problems that gave rise to the 
problems in the first place would not follow.  As Forman writes: 
African Americans wanted more law enforcement, but they didn’t want 
only law enforcement.  Many adopted what we might think of as an all-of-
the-above strategy. . . . But because African Americans are a minority na-
tionally, they needed help to win national action against poverty, joblessness, 
segregation, and other root causes of crime.  The help never arrived. . . . So 
African Americans never got the Marshall Plan — just the tough-on-crime 
laws.  (pp. 12–13) 
Forman ends Part I of the book with a discussion of black police.  
One of the major goals of the civil rights movement was to enlist black 
police officers (pp. 84–88).  The purpose was twofold: to end discrimi-
nation in the police force and to curb police brutality against the black 
community.  However, neither goal was realized.  Forman highlights 
structural constraints as well as how class-based and ideological divi-
sions between those advocating for more black police and the citizens 
signing up to be police created mismatched or opposing goals (pp.  
100–01). 
Black civil rights advocates made assumptions about the attitudes 
of black officers and the role they would play to combat discrimination.  
“The case for black police had always been premised on the unques-
tioned assumption of racial solidarity between black citizens and black 
officers” (p. 107).  However, Forman’s account reveals that the “blacks 
who joined police departments had a far more complicated set of atti-
tudes, motivations, and incentives than those pushing for black police 
had assumed” (p. 107).  The reality of employment discrimination meant 
that many black officers signed up to obtain a good job that was stable, 
secure, and offered good benefits (pp. 89–90, 110–11).  These officers did 
not conceive of their role within the police departments as an extension 
of the civil rights movement (p. 111).  Indeed, according to Forman, 
some did not view their work as racially significant (pp. 109–10). 
Forman also highlights the racism that many black officers faced in 
the department.  In the 1940s, black officers were segregated in separate 
and unequal facilities and did not have the same police powers as white 
officers.  For instance, in Atlanta and other police departments across 
the country, black officers could not exercise power over whites and 
could only patrol black neighborhoods (pp. 86–87).  Both the racism that 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 15 Drug prosecutions increased by 300% from 1982 to 1984, and arrests for sales, as opposed to 
possession, increased from 3% to 45% of drug arrests between 1980 and 1984 (pp. 143–44).  The 
same people were being arrested, but now prosecutors were charging them with more serious of-
fenses, and the harsher sentencing guidelines increased pressure on them to plead guilty (pp. 144).  
During the crack cocaine epidemic of the late 1980s, homicide rates tripled over one seven-year 
period (p. 160). 
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limited the job prospects of blacks and the racism that existed within 
police forces “made it less likely that [black officers] would do what 
many reformers hoped they would: buck the famously powerful police 
culture.  The few who tried paid a high price” (p. 111).  “Even those 
black officers inclined to use their political capital to fight police brutal-
ity would often find themselves in the minority.  Most of their col-
leagues — black or white — wanted to fight for wages, benefits, and an 
equal shot at promotions” (p. 111). 
In his discussion of the black police officer, Forman illuminates the 
influence of class differences within black communities.  He argues that 
middle-class blacks would often advocate for more policing against the 
lower-class blacks who were engaged in crime (pp. 108–10).  Citing a 
handful of studies showing that black police were just as physically abu-
sive as their white colleagues and sometimes even harsher, Forman con-
cludes that “[i]t turned out that a surprising number of black officers 
simply didn’t like other black people — at least not the poor blacks they 
tended to police” (p. 108).16  Despite this observation, Forman also 
acknowledges that, “[o]f course, most black officers didn’t share those 
views.  But even those who saw themselves as pro-black . . . engaged in 
aggressive tactics against black citizens whom they saw as a threat to 
law and order.  In part, their conduct reflected class divisions within the 
black community” (p. 108).  He notes that “[w]hen some blacks (usually 
middle class) demanded action against others (usually poor), many ‘pro-
black’ officers responded with special enthusiasm” (p. 108).  We think 
the issues are more complicated than that, as we discuss in more detail 
below.  But Forman is entirely right to note that black-on-black policing 
was not characterized by intraracial harmony.  The end result was that 
while many police forces eventually integrated, the goal of reducing po-
lice violence against black communities was largely unattained. 
In Part II of the book, Forman highlights how the tough-on-crime 
choices made by some African American leaders reshaped the criminal 
justice system in ways that contributed to mass incarceration and utterly 
failed to address the crime and violence decimating black communities.  
Over and over again, some black leaders responded to crime within their 
communities with harsher policing practices and more severe punish-
ments (p. 165).  Yet violent crime rates continued to rise (p. 178).17 
Black leaders’ actions helped usher in a new era of policing and pro-
grams that affected primarily indigent African American communities 
in negative ways and helped to create a “culture of . . . intrusion[] into 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 16 Forman references a study conducted by the University of Michigan that found some level of 
anti-black prejudice in 28% of black officers in precincts in Boston, Chicago, and Washington, D.C., 
as well as a report put out by the Katzenbach Commission (p. 108). 
 17 Many African American leaders adopted the “war” rhetoric, and some requested troops be 
sent to their streets while others asked President Ronald Reagan “to declare a state of emergency 
and to deploy the National Guard” (pp. 165–66). 
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the daily lives of black citizens” (p. 171).  Police stepped up their weap-
onry and tactics and adopted “operations” throughout the country to 
battle drugs and violence (p. 167). 
One example, Washington, D.C.’s antidrug initiative, Operation 
Clean Sweep, gave officers power “to clear corners, establish roadblocks, 
make undercover purchases, seize cars, and condemn apartments”  
(p. 167).  Clean Sweep also created specialized units, such as the Rapid 
Deployment Unit (RDU), to carry out these practices (p. 170).  RDU 
officers would conduct aggressive and usually demeaning stops of black 
citizens, often cursing or yelling at citizens, performing warrantless 
searches, and giving unlawful orders (pp. 170–71).  While one might 
assume that these officers were white, more than fifty percent of the 
officers involved in Clean Sweep were black (p. 168).   
A majority of black citizens saw Clean Sweep and asset forfeiture as 
a positive way to regain control of the streets (p. 173).  However, rather 
than targeting kingpins, these measures treated users and street-level 
dealers harshly, stymieing their ability to vote, find employment, obtain 
housing, and attend college (p. 174).  Furthermore, Clean Sweep com-
pletely failed to suppress the drug trade or reduce violence.  Instead, 
murder rates continued to rise (pp. 176–79).  By 1995, the murder rate 
was still three times what it had been in the years before the crack epi-
demic (p. 194), and “blacks experienced violent victimization at rates 
fifty percent higher than those for whites” (pp. 194–95). 
Once again, the response of many black leaders was to rely on the 
criminal justice system.  The National Organization of Black Law  
Enforcement Executives (NOBLE), while calling for the creation of so-
lutions that would address the root causes of crime, also supported the 
war on drugs and mandatory minimum sentences (p. 114).  Furthermore, 
then–United States Attorney Eric Holder, a highly respected African 
American prosecutor, advocated the use of pretext stops (pp. 202–03).  
This controversial policing practice trained police officers to identify 
suspicious vehicles and to find a reason to search them (pp. 212–13).  
Holder felt that pretext stops would reduce violence in the short term 
by getting guns out of the hands of young black men (p. 203).  While 
Holder acknowledged that black drivers would be much more likely to 
be stopped, searched, and arrested than white drivers, he also knew that 
ninety-four percent of black homicide victims were slain by black as-
sailants, and thus the concerns about discrimination were outweighed 
by the need to protect blacks from crime (pp. 202–03).  Forman explains 
that pretext stops continue today and have become an integral part of 
racially disparate policing throughout the United States (pp. 211–13).  
This is particularly frustrating, Forman argues, because ending pre-
textual stops is one of the easiest and most direct ways to combat racial 
disparities in the criminal justice system (p. 213). 
Forman’s account of the decisions made by African American lead-
ers to protect their communities from drugs and violence illuminates the 
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dangers of failing to attend to power and structure.  They relied upon 
criminal justice system responses with the belief that more systemic so-
lutions to address the root causes of crime would follow.  In hindsight, 
their choices seem naïve.  The question is whether we are being similarly 
naïve in advocating for racial diversity in policing as a solution to dis-
criminatory and violent policing.  Our answer is “yes.”  We elaborate 
below. 
II.  POLICING OUR OWN 
Discussions about race and policing almost always have as their 
predicate the idea that the agents of racial profiling and police violence 
are white.  The notion, at least implicitly, seems to be that black police 
officers are not implicated in the race and policing problems we have 
witnessed from Ferguson to New York to Los Angeles to Chicago, 
among other places.  Broadly articulated, our goal in this part is to chal-
lenge that assumption.  In the context of doing so, we explore what role, 
if any, black police officers can play in mitigating, if not eliminating, the 
overpolicing of African Americans. 
Our starting point is the observation that, over the past few decades, 
the police departments in American inner cities have undergone signifi-
cant demographic shifts.  This demographic change is one of the reasons 
why Professor David Sklansky has suggested that modern departments 
are “not your father’s police department.”18  Consider the data below.19 





Black Latino Asian 
Chicago PD 47.9% 24.7% 18.8% 0.3% 
Houston PD 54.9% 22.8% 25.3% 6.0% 
Los Angeles PD 64.6% 11.6% 43.4% 7.1% 
New York PD 47.8% 16.1% 26.1% 5.5% 
Philadelphia PD 43.2% 33.4% 8.2% 1.5% 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 18 David Alan Sklansky, Not Your Father’s Police Department: Making Sense of the New Dem-
ographics of Law Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209 (2006). 
 19 GOVERNING, DIVERSITY ON THE FORCE: WHERE POLICE DON’T MIRROR COMMU-
NITIES 7–10 (2015), http://media.navigatored.com/documents/policediversityreport.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/GZJ5-UBSP] (gathering data about black, Hispanic, and Asian police officers across major 
American cities); see also Police Department Race and Ethnicity Demographic Data, GOVERNING, 
http://www.governing.com/gov-data/safety-justice/police-department-officer-demographics-minority-
representation.html [https://perma.cc/7PRL-ZVKG].  For 2015 demographic statistics in New York, 
Chicago, Los Angeles, and Houston, see Jeremy Ashkenas & Haeyoun Park, The Race Gap in  
America’s Police Departments, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2jVoad2 [https://perma. 
cc/B49T-NSHS]. 
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Table 1 reveals that in many police departments across the country, 
and certainly in police departments that are often at the epicenter of 
debates about race and policing, people of color are part of the force — 
and in nontrivial numbers.  The Los Angeles Police Department, for 
example, is now a majority-minority police department; 64.6% of the 
officers are nonwhite.20  In Chicago, 24.7% of the officers are black and 
18.8% are Latino.  Police departments in Houston, Philadelphia, and 
New York similarly have relatively robust levels of racial diversity.  This 
demographic backdrop, even without more, militates against framing 
racial profiling and police violence solely with respect to white police 
officers.21  Other reasons also caution against the conclusion that racial-
ized policing is solely a white officer phenomenon.22 
First, the legal backdrop against which police officers act is the same 
for black and white officers.  In particular, like white officers, black 
officers can draw on Fourth Amendment law as a source of empower-
ment to target other African Americans.23  Second, conscious or uncon-
scious racial biases might lead black police officers to aggressively police 
other African Americans.  Think of these biases as “same-race biases” 
or “intraracial biases,” because both the victims and the perpetrators of 
these biases have the same racial identity.24  Third, black police officers, 
like white police officers, might experience a set of anxieties or vulnera-
bilities that increase the likelihood that they will mobilize violence 
against other African Americans.  An example of what we mean is “mas-
culinity threat.”25  A relatively new body of research demonstrates that 
police officers who feel that their masculinity is being challenged or un-
dermined in the context of a particular interaction are more likely to use 
violence than officers who do not experience that masculinity threat.26  
Another example is “racial anxiety.”  Research on this concept shows 
that police officers who worry that they will be perceived as racist in 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 20 The data excludes all non-Hispanic whites, but it is worth noting that some of the officers 
captured in the “Latino” column above may also be white. 
 21 In 2007, black officers represented 11.9% of officers in local police departments across the 
nation.  Jeff Rojek, Richard Rosenfeld & Scott Decker, Policing Race: The Racial Stratification of 
Searches in Police Traffic Stops, 50 CRIMINOLOGY 993, 995 (2012) (citing BRIAN A. REAVES, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 231174, LOCAL POLICE DE-
PARTMENTS, 2007, at 14 (2010), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd07.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
T9PA-DP73]). 
 22 For a more extended analysis, see Carbado & Rock, supra note 8, at 163–65. 
 23 See infra section II.E, pp. 2015–23. 
 24 See infra section II.A, pp. 1992–95. 
 25 L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Interrogating Racial Violence, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 115, 128 (2014). 
 26 Id. at 130–31.  Masculinity threat further exacerbates racial violence because “black men are 
perceived as more masculine than men from other racial groups.”  Id. at 136; see id. at 135–38. 
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particular interactions are more likely to use force against black citizens 
than officers who do not experience racial anxiety.27 
Still another reason to believe that black police officers might end up 
racially targeting African Americans relates to some structural features 
of policing.  If police officers are specifically deployed to proactively 
police communities in which African Americans live — and if their per-
formance evaluations, pay increases, and promotions are tied to, among 
other measures, the number of stops and frisks they conduct, the number 
of citations they issue, and the number of arrests they effectuate — black 
police officers, like white police officers, will end up having significant 
contact with African Americans.28 
A final reason to expect that black police officers will be implicated 
in the range of race and policing scenarios with which the United States 
has been grappling in the wake of Ferguson is this: to fit into and be-
come a part of the law enforcement community of “blue,” black police 
officers may have to marginalize the concerns of and disassociate them-
selves from the community of “black.”29 
We should be clear to note that, notwithstanding what we have said 
thus far, at the end of the day, the question of whether and how black 
officers are implicated in racially motivated policing against other  
African Americans is an empirical question.  One of the reasons our 
arguments are largely, though not entirely, theoretical is because the em-
pirical evidence on the racial quality and effects of black policing points 
in contradictory directions.30  In this respect, our goal in the rest of this 
Part is relatively modest: to suggest that it cannot be so readily assumed 
that, with respect to African American communities, black policing and 
white policing look fundamentally different.  We begin with a discussion 
of same-race biases. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 27 Godsil & Richardson, supra note 5, at 2248–51. 
 28 See Saki Knafo, A Black Police Officer’s Fight Against the N.Y.P.D., N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 
18, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2jVQZXA [https://perma.cc/F9CG-UPFQ]. 
 29 See, e.g., KENNETH BOLTON JR. & JOE R. FEAGIN, BLACK IN BLUE: AFRICAN- 
AMERICAN POLICE OFFICERS AND RACISM 202–04 (2004) (noting that officers who stood up to 
injustice were viewed as oversensitive, troublemakers, or radical); R. ALAN THOMPSON, CAREER 
EXPERIENCES OF AFRICAN AMERICAN POLICE EXECUTIVES: BLACK IN BLUE REVISITED 
73 (2003) (explaining the view of some black officers that “speaking out on sensitive issues had the 
potential to limit future opportunities for promotion”). 
 30 See THOMPSON, supra note 29, at 81–83 (discussing early studies and their limitations); see 
also, e.g., Joscha Legewie & Jeffrey Fagan, Group Threat, Police Officer Diversity and the Deadly 
Use of Police Force 33–36 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., 
Paper No. 14-512, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2778692 [https://perma.cc/G987-6T3T] (report-
ing no conclusive finding regarding the overall influence of black officers in the department on the 
rate of officer-involved killings of black civilians); Sean Nicholson-Crotty et al., Will More Black 
Cops Matter? Officer Race and Police-Involved Homicides of Black Citizens, 77 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 
206, 211–12 (2017) (finding no significant relationship between proportion of black officers and 
police-involved killings of black civilians in 2014, but finding a significant — and positive — rela-
tionship in 2015). 
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A.  Same-Race Biases 
The basic point here is that African Americans (and other people of 
color) have some of the same racial biases against other African  
Americans that white people have.  Think of these as “same-race” or 
“intra-racial” biases (an intragroup phenomenon analogous to same-sex 
sexual harassment).  Consider, for example, the phenomenon of implicit 
biases.  In order to make sense of our world and our experiences, our 
minds have developed mental processes that operate automatically, un-
intentionally, and without our conscious awareness.31  Research in the 
field of social psychology reveals that humans have developed uncon-
scious, that is, implicit, associations related to race that consist of ste- 
reotypes and attitudes about racial groups that often conflict with their 
consciously held thoughts and feelings.32  These implicit associations can 
shape people’s perceptions, judgments, and behaviors in both positive 
and negative ways. 
Over four decades of research reveals that both whites and African 
Americans unconsciously associate black people with negative values 
and white people with positive ones.33  That is to say, African Americans 
often have negative “attitudes” about other African Americans.  Second, 
both whites and African Americans generally hold negative stereotypes 
of other black people, including stereotypes of black people as criminally 
inclined, violent, and dangerous.34  Professors Sandra Graham and 
Brian Lowery, for instance, found that priming words related to the cat-
egory “black” promoted more negative trait ratings of a hypothetical 
adolescent offender.35  Importantly, this effect emerged among both 
black and nonblack police and probation officers.36  Moreover, the par-
ticipants’ responses to the prime were not impacted by the participants’ 
consciously held attitudes toward blacks,37 suggesting that even well-
meaning, racially egalitarian officers may still fall prey to these biases.  
At least implicitly, then, black police officers likely feel just as unsafe 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 31 For a more robust discussion of implicit biases, see generally Richardson, supra note 4, at 
2052–56 (describing how implicit biases can affect interactions between police officers and citizens). 
 32 See id. at 2042–43. 
 33 That is, they associate blackness with negativity and whiteness with positivity.  See, e.g., John 
T. Jost et al., A Decade of System Justification Theory: Accumulated Evidence of Conscious and 
Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo, 25 POL. PSYCHOL. 881, 897–98 (2004) (finding that forty 
percent of blacks show implicit negativity toward their ingroup, contrasted with less than ten per-
cent of whites).  
 34 See Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Ad-
olescent Offenders, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 486–87 (2004); Kelly Welch, Black Criminal Ste-
reotypes and Racial Profiling, 23 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 276, 278 (2007) (“[A] clear majority of 
both Whites and Blacks agreed with the statement ‘blacks are aggressive or violent.’”). 
 35 Graham & Lowery, supra note 34, at 487. 
 36 See id. at 493 (police officers); id. at 496 (probation officers). 
 37 Id. at 496–97. 
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around the average young black man in the inner city as do white police 
officers. 
Studies reveal that police officers are not immune from these implicit 
racial biases.  There is no good reason a priori why we would expect 
them to be.  Moreover, implicit biases are most likely to influence be-
haviors and judgments in situations where decisionmaking is highly dis-
cretionary, information is limited and ambiguous, and individuals are 
cognitively depleted.38  These are the conditions under which most po-
lice officers, including black police officers, operate on the street. 
As an indication of the kind of empirical evidence that bears out the 
implicit biases of police officers, consider the shooter-bias line of re-
search.  In these studies, subjects, including police officers, watch a 
video that contains photographs of either black men or white men posed 
in front of different backgrounds and holding either guns or crime- 
irrelevant objects such as cell phones.39  Participants are asked to 
quickly decide whether the men are armed by pressing buttons labeled 
“shoot” or “don’t shoot.”40  These shooter-bias studies typically result in 
subjects mistakenly “shooting” unarmed blacks more often than un-
armed whites.41  They also “shoot” armed targets more quickly when 
they are black versus white.42  Studies similarly demonstrate that offi- 
cers who work in neighborhoods with high percentages of black indi-
viduals are more likely to exhibit shooter bias.43 
Relevant for our purposes is the fact that African Americans, includ-
ing African American police officers, evince shooter bias as well.  Mul-
tiple studies have shown that white and nonwhite officers do not differ 
in racial bias on shooting tasks, either with respect to response time (for 
example, how quickly they “shoot” a black man as opposed to a white 
target with a weapon) or with respect to stereotype-consistent mistakes 
(for example, their propensity to “shoot” a black man without a weapon 
or to “not shoot” a white man who is armed).44 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 38 See, e.g., Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: A Decade of Research on Racial 
Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 8 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 201, 210 (2014); 
Tiffani J. Johnson et al., The Impact of Cognitive Stressors in the Emergency Department on Phy-
sician Implicit Bias, 23 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 297, 302 (2016). 
 39 Correll et al., supra note 38, at 202–03; Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police 
Officers and Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006, 
1009–10 (2007).  
 40 Correll et al., supra note 38, at 203. 
 41 See id. at 206 (summarizing prior research). 
 42 See, e.g., Joshua Correll et al., The Influence of Stereotypes on Decisions to Shoot, 37 EUR. J. 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1102, 1103 (2007).  
 43 Correll et al., supra note 38, at 202.  
 44 See Correll et al., supra note 39, at 1011 & n.3 (finding that white and nonwhite officers did 
not differ in response times); Melody S. Sadler et al., The World Is Not Black and White: Racial 
Bias in the Decision to Shoot in a Multiethnic Context, 68 J. SOC. ISSUES 286, 299 (2012) (finding 
that Latino officers did not differ from white officers in response time or accuracy); see also Joshua 
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Moreover, evidence shows that police departments with more black 
officers engage in more racial profiling than those with fewer black of-
ficers.45  Consistent with that, the Department of Justice (DOJ) uncov-
ered extensive racial bias in the predominantly black New Orleans  
Police Department.46  According to the DOJ, police officers in New  
Orleans failed to articulate sufficient facts to justify stops, searches, and 
arrests.47  Finally, data indicates that black officers are just as likely as 
their white colleagues to form nonbehavioral suspicions48 about black 
suspects, and that black officers who stop a black man are more likely 
to arrest him than they are to arrest a stopped white suspect.49  The 
foregoing might explain why there is only limited evidence that police 
forces with more minority officers show more equitable patterns of  
policing.50 
This brings us back to our more central point: as a result of implicit 
racial biases, officers are more likely to focus their attention on black, 
rather than white, individuals.51  This is true even when the officers are 
consciously egalitarian, reject racial profiling, or are black themselves.52  
Finally, these implicit biases may cause officers to evaluate any ambig-
uous behaviors they observe as more consistent with threat and crimi-
nality than innocence and may influence how quickly officers identify, 
or misidentify, weapons.53  In sum, the study of implicit bias demon-
strates that race influences who will capture an officer’s attention and, 
once that attention is captured, whose ambiguous behaviors will be per-
ceived as violent and dangerous. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially Threat-
ening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1324 (2002).  These studies show 
no difference between white and nonwhite participants in community samples. 
 45 Vicky M. Wilkins & Brian N. Williams, Black or Blue: Racial Profiling and Representative 
Bureaucracy, 68 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 654, 660–61 (2008). 
 46 See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW  
ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT (2011).  The DOJ noted that the record of arrests in New  
Orleans “reflected on [its] face apparent constitutional violations.”  Id. at viii. 
 47 See id.  
 48 A nonbehavioral suspicion includes such criteria as the suspect’s location or appearance, and, 
according to Professor Geoffrey Alpert and his colleagues, “do[es] not necessarily provide a clear 
justification for a stop.”  Geoffrey P. Alpert et al., Police Suspicion and Discretionary Decision 
Making During Citizen Stops, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 407, 419 (2005).  
 49 Robert A. Brown & James Frank, Race and Officer Decision Making: Examining Differences 
in Arrest Outcomes Between Black and White Officers, 23 JUST. Q. 96, 119 (2006). 
 50 See generally id. at 97 (discussing the lack of evidence of behavioral differences between mi-
nority and white officers). 
 51 For more in-depth analysis of the concepts discussed in this section, see Richardson, supra 
note 4, at 2085–86. 
 52 See Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 886–87 (2004). 
 53 See Correll et al., supra note 39, at 1013–15; see also Correll et al., supra note 44, at 1325–26. 
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On some level, the fact that implicit biases influence black and white 
officers alike should not surprise us, particularly because the nature of 
police work requires officers to think about crime.  Researchers have 
found that simply thinking about crime is sufficient to trigger uncon-
scious racial biases in police officers and that these biases influence their 
behaviors in ways that disadvantage blacks.54  The very nature of po-
licing, then, is effectively a racial prime for blackness.  Understood in 
this way, the fact that, across many American cities, black police offi- 
cers, like white officers, spend a considerable amount of time policing 
majority-minority communities means that they are always effectively 
rehearsing the “black as criminal” stereotype.  This is important to note 
because practicing associations — racial or otherwise — strengthens 
them.  This might explain why officers working in these majority- 
minority areas exhibit higher levels of implicit bias than those who do 
not.55 
That we have focused on implicit bias in this way is not to suggest 
that explicit biases are not also at play.  Quite likely they are.  Our point 
is to suggest that, even assuming explicit biases away, the existence of 
implicit biases still leaves African Americans vulnerable to overpolicing. 
B.  Black Officer “Self-Threats” 
In this section, we explain how a host of “self-threats” can create 
conditions that increase the likelihood of officers, including black offi- 
cers, aggressively targeting black civilians.  Both of us have elsewhere 
laid out the main perceived threats that cause officers to overpolice 
black men.  The analysis here draws on those frameworks and applies 
portions of them to black police officers to illuminate how they, too, are 
susceptible to these self-threats.56  Here, as there, we focus on four main 
threats: social dominance threat, stereotype threat, masculinity threat, 
and racial solidarity threat. 
1.  Social Dominance Threat. — For more than twenty years, social 
psychologists have been developing and providing empirical support for 
what they call “social dominance theory.”  The basic idea is that the 
persistence of social inequality derives in part from people’s endorse-
ment of hierarchy-promoting ideologies57 that effectively lock in extant 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 54 Eberhardt et al., supra note 52, at 876–77, 883. 
 55 Cf. Correll et al., supra note 39, at 1021 (noting that officers “who reported working in com-
munities with . . . high proportions of minority residents showed particularly strong patterns of 
bias”). 
 56 See Carbado & Rock, supra note 8, at 175–85; Godsil & Richardson, supra note 5; Richardson 
& Goff, supra note 25.  We are immensely grateful to our respective coauthors in those articles for 
their contributions to this essay. 
 57 Felicia Pratto et al., Social Dominance Orientation: A Personality Variable Predicting Social 
and Political Attitudes, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 741, 741 (1994) (“The theory pos-
tulates that societies minimize group conflict by creating consensus on ideologies that promote the 
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advantages and disadvantages.58  Under the theory, people who endorse 
such ideologies are said to have a social dominance orientation, or 
SDO.59 
Although scholars typically describe SDO as an individual difference 
variable, empirical evidence suggests that it is also a group-based phe-
nomenon.  In other words, where one is located in a particular social 
hierarchy partly determines one’s SDO.  Members of high-status groups 
generally have a stronger SDO than members of lower-status groups.60  
For example, men tend to have a higher SDO than women,61 while 
whites evidence a higher SDO than blacks or Latinos; similarly, police 
officers evidence a stronger SDO than civilians, even after controlling 
for a range of other characteristics, such as gender, social class, age, and 
educational background.62  A particular feature of the social dominance 
literature that bears emphasis is the finding that people’s SDO orienta-
tion increases when their sense of relative status in society is  
threatened.63 
Social dominance theory likely applies to policing.  Even beyond po-
lice officers’ elevated SDO, police cultures and trainings are fundamen-
tally hierarchical.64  Moreover, “the criminal justice system is itself hier-
archically ordered, with suspects at the bottom, police officers 
somewhere in the middle, and judges at the top.”65  Compounding mat-
ters is the fact that, “historically, race has been the most perniciously 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
superiority of one group over others. . . . To work smoothly, these ideologies must be widely ac-
cepted within a society, appearing as self-apparent truths; hence we call them hierarchy-legitimizing 
myths.” (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted)). 
 58 Daria Roithmayr, Locked in Inequality: The Persistence of Discrimination, 9 MICH. J. RACE 
& L. 31, 33 (2003).   
 59 Pratto et al., supra note 57, at 741–42. 
 60 Id. at 758. 
 61 Id. at 747. 
 62 Jim Sidanius et al., Social Dominance Orientation, Hierarchy Attenuators and Hierarchy 
Enhancers: Social Dominance Theory and the Criminal Justice System, 24 J. APPLIED SOC. PSY-
CHOL. 338, 348–51 (1994); see also Carbado & Rock, supra note 8, at 176. 
 63 Eric D. Knowles et al., On the Malleability of Ideology: Motivated Construals of Color Blind-
ness, 96 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 857, 860, 863–64 (2009).  The researchers contrasted 
the distributive justice colorblindness principle (the belief that one’s race should not matter for 
outcomes in life) with the procedural justice colorblindness principle (the belief that race should not 
be a factor in how individuals are treated, even in situations where inequality exists and differential 
treatment could ameliorate it).  Id. at 859.  While the former has the potential to effect change, the 
latter tends to entrench inequality.  Professor Eric Knowles and colleagues found that whites who 
perceived more threat from blacks tended to endorse procedural colorblindness more strongly.  Id. 
at 862.  Moreover, asking whites to identify their ethnicity, which was shown in pretesting to cause 
whites to think about racial threat, was associated with spontaneous generation of procedural (as 
opposed to distributive) descriptions of what colorblindness is.  Id. at 860.  The authors interpreted 
these findings as evidence that whites feeling threatened would selectively endorse ideologies that 
maintained their high social status.  Id. at 863. 
 64 See Carbado & Rock, supra note 8, at 177 (citing Sidanius et al., supra note 62, at 342). 
 65 Id. 
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enforced hierarchy in the United States.”66  Finally, “the criminal justice 
system and on-the-ground policing have functioned as significant sites 
in which state actors have enforced this hierarchy.”67 
As one of us has argued elsewhere, the preceding factors could coa-
lesce to create a law enforcement investment in “social dominance po-
licing”68 — in other words, “policing that consciously or unconsciously 
maintains the officer’s sense of authority, control, and power and the 
officer’s sense of the suspect’s vulnerability, diminished agency, and 
powerlessness.”69  To put the point another way, “social dominance po-
licing is predicated upon police/civilian encounters in which the police 
and the suspect know who is in charge, know where power and vulner-
ability reside, and know how to conduct themselves in ways that affirm 
and re-inscribe this hierarchy.”70 
Various features of police training instantiate norms of social domi-
nance.  For example, officers are instructed to maintain control over 
every interaction because any threat to their authority is potentially dan-
gerous.  They are taught to do so by enacting “command presence,” 
which involves “tak[ing] charge of a situation” and “projecting an aura 
of confidence and decisiveness.”71  This command presence interactional 
technique is expressly designed to establish and signal the officer’s hier-
archical position, a position of dominance that African Americans can 
“threaten” in any number of ways. 
For one thing, simply asserting rights could undermine the hierarchy 
upon which social dominance policing rests.  This is precisely why many 
black parents expressly instruct their children to overcomply during 
their engagements with the police.72  For another, questioning an of-
ficer’s authority more directly challenges that dominance and could 
prompt the officer to express his power by arresting the black citizen.73  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 66 Id.  
 67 Id. at 178.  
 68 Id.  
 69 Id.  
 70 Id.  
 71 Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”: Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops, and Police Train-
ing, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671, 674 (2009) (citing Mary Newman, Comment, Barnes v. City 
of Cincinnati: Command Presence, Gender Bias, and Problems of Police Aggression, 29 HARV. J.L. 
& GENDER 485, 491 (2006)); see also Geoffrey P. Alpert, Roger G. Dunham & John M. MacDonald, 
Interactive Police-Citizen Encounters that Result in Force, 7 POLICE Q. 475, 476 (2004) (explaining 
the difference between “dominating force” and “accommodating force”); L. Song Richardson, Im-
plicit Racial Bias and Racial Anxiety: Implications for Stops and Frisks, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
73, 80 (2017). 
 72 See Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 1020 
(2002) (describing this as “surplus compliance”). 
 73 See, e.g., CHRISTY E. LOPEZ, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW & POLICY, DISOR-
DERLY (MIS)CONDUCT: THE PROBLEM WITH “CONTEMPT OF COP” ARRESTS 2 (2010) (“There 
is abundant evidence that police overuse disorderly conduct and similar statutes to arrest people 
who ‘disrespect’ them or express disagreement with their actions.”); Douglas A. Smith & Christy A. 
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Still a third way an African American might threaten an officer’s social 
dominance is through some form of confrontation.  As one scholar  
observes: 
[B]y approaching people from a dominance perspective, police officers en-
courage resistance and defiance, create hostility, and increase the likelihood 
that confrontations will escalate into struggles over dominance that are 
based on force.  The police may begin a spiral of conflict that increases the 
risks of harm for both the police and for the public.74 
Although not as robust as that of white officers, black police officers 
typically evidence relatively high levels of SDO.75  Yet such an orienta-
tion does not, a priori, guarantee that black police officers would be 
committed to social dominance policing.  Indeed, research suggests that 
high-SDO, low-status individuals will show bias in favor of the high-
status group only when they believe that the hierarchy on which that 
group’s high status is based is legitimate.76  One way to understand this 
in the context of policing would be to say that black police officers are 
unlikely to manifest social dominance–oriented policing against other 
black men unless they perceive the policing practices of their police de-
partment to be legitimate.  A range of incentives exist for black police 
officers to view their departmental practices in precisely this way.77 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Visher, Street-Level Justice: Situational Determinants of Police Arrest Decisions, 29 SOC. PROBS. 
167, 175 (1981) (“Police work involves controlling people, and this task is facilitated by the inequal-
ity of power and authority between police and the public.  Some of our findings suggest that police 
act in ways to maintain this disparity.”); see also Carbado & Rock, supra note 8, at 178. 
 74 Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social Regulation, 81 B.U. 
L. REV. 361, 369 (2001). 
 75 See Sidanius et al., supra note 62, at 350 (“[E]ven after the effects of ethnicity were accounted 
for, police officers were still found to be significantly and quite strongly more dominance oriented 
than civilians . . . .”).  Note that the social dominance literature deals in relative endorsement of 
statements used to gauge SDO, rather than absolute endorsement, limiting what is known about 
exactly how strongly officers, or civilians, openly endorse dominance attitudes. 
 76 Shana Levin et al., Social Dominance Orientation and Intergroup Bias: The Legitimation of 
Favoritism for High-Status Groups, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 144, 149–50 
(2002). 
 77 A closely related theory to social dominance theory, system justification theory, explores why 
some low-status group members would endorse hierarchy-enhancing ideologies and engage in other 
behavior that runs counter to their group interests.  For instance, research suggests that low-income 
individuals tend not to support income redistribution efforts, a perplexing phenomenon.  For further 
discussion of this point, see John T. Jost, System Justification Theory as Compliment, Complement, 
and Corrective to Theories of Social Identification and Social Dominance, in SOCIAL MOTIVA-
TION 223 (David Dunning ed., 2011).  This sort of behavior is problematic in the context of classic 
psychological theories like social identity theory, which predict that individuals will generally act 
to elevate the status and esteem of themselves and their group.  See generally Michael A. Hogg, 
Social Identity Theory, in CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES 111 (Peter J. 
Burke ed., 2006) (for an overview); Henri Tajfel & John Turner, An Integrative Theory of Intergroup 
Conflict, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 33 (William G. Austin & 
Stephen Worchel eds., 1979) (for the original formulation of the theory).  For a more in-depth dis-
cussion of system justification theory and its applications to law, see Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, 
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First, to view policing practices as illegitimate is to tell oneself that 
one is doing life-and-death work for a system that is not simply unjust 
but racially unjust.78  Second, people are more likely to justify systems 
and organizational cultures when they have a desire to create a common 
or shared experience.79  The fact that both police culture and formal 
training emphasize uniformity in attitudes and behavior80 means that 
black police officers likely experience pressure to integrate themselves 
within and reproduce the department’s epistemic and cultural commu-
nity.  Third, individuals who are dependent on an organization or sys-
tem tend to justify it.81  To the extent that black and white police officers 
alike rely on police authority to maintain their safety, they may take 
comfort in seeing that system as legitimate and well constructed.82  Fi-
nally, black officers’ explicit and implicit biases of other African  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
System Justification Theory and Research: Implications for Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Jus-
tice, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1119, 1126–44, 1155–62 (2006).  The particular overlaps and distinctions 
between system justification theory and social dominance theory are beyond the scope of this paper.  
For excellent discussions of the two theories, see Jost et al., supra note 33, at 888; Jost, supra; Felicia 
Pratto et al., Social Dominance Theory and the Dynamics of Intergroup Relations: Taking Stock 
and Looking Forward, 17 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 271 (2006); and Jim Sidanius et al., Social 
Dominance Theory: Its Agenda and Method, 25 POL. PSYCHOL. 845, 868–70 (2004).  
 78 Our reference to life and death here is particularly relevant because system justification is 
predicted by mortality salience, such that individuals who consider their own death frequently tend 
to system justify more than those who do not.  Erin P. Hennes et al., Not All Ideologies Are Created 
Equal: Epistemic, Existential, and Relational Needs Predict System-Justifying Attitudes, 30 SOC. 
COGNITION 669, 671, 675–77 (2012).  
 79 Id. at 675–77.  
 80 Eugene A. Paoline III, Taking Stock: Toward a Richer Understanding of Police Culture, 31 J. 
CRIM. JUST. 199, 203 (2003). 
 81 See Aaron C. Kay & Justin Friesen, On Social Stability and Social Change: Understanding 
When System Justification Does and Does Not Occur, 20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 
360, 361 (2011). 
 82 This should not be taken to suggest that black and white officers experience system justifica-
tion similarly, however.  To the contrary, an important element of system justification theory is that 
system justification operates fundamentally differently for high- as opposed to low-status individ-
uals.  Specifically, for high-status individuals, system justification motives and group esteem mo-
tives act in concert, such that believing one’s group to be highly motivated or talented (and thus 
legitimately deserving of high status) is complemented by the belief that one’s system works effec-
tively and fairly to reward deserving parties.  Note how different a calculus is necessary for low-
status individuals, however.  For these individuals, system justification motives act counter to group 
esteem motives.  For a Latina woman, for instance, believing that the system is just requires that 
she endorse the view that women, Latinos, and particularly Latina women are less able or less 
motivated (and thus less deserving of high status) than whites, men, and particularly white men.  
Likewise, maintaining a high opinion of her group’s worth demands that she reject the system as 
unjust and ineffective at elevating appropriate parties to high-status positions, a rejection which 
may cause her substantial anxiety.  Thus, whereas for high-status members of a social system, en-
dorsement of legitimizing myths like meritocracy should be relatively consistent across individuals 
and situations, for low-status members, the theory dictates that contextual or personal factors will 
predict whether legitimizing myths are endorsed.  See, e.g., Arnold K. Ho et al., Social Dominance 
Orientation: Revisiting the Structure and Function of a Variable Predicting Social and Political 
Attitudes, 38 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 583, 584–85 (2012) (suggesting that SDO is 
more accurately conceived of as two component parts: a preference for unequal social relations 
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Americans would matter here as well.83  These perceptions would legit-
imize the utilization of aggressive policing tactics against a group that is 
presumptively perceived to be violent and dangerous — African  
Americans generally and black men in particular.84 
2.  Stereotype Threat. — Another threat that could impact how black 
officers police other African Americans relates to stereotype threat.  Ste-
reotype threat refers to the anxiety that occurs when people are con-
cerned about confirming a negative stereotype about a social group they 
value and to which they belong.85  People can experience stereotype 
threat even when they do not endorse the stereotype or believe it applies 
to them.  All that is required is that individuals are aware of the negative 
stereotype and are in a situation that raises concerns that they will be 
judged in terms of that stereotype.86 
Across a number of studies, researchers have learned that police of-
ficers experience stereotype threat arising from the concern that they 
will be perceived as racist by the civilians they encounter.87  Disturb-
ingly, these concerns can result in racial violence.  Studies demonstrate 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
(SDO-E, for equality) and a preference for some groups to dominate over others (SDO-D, for dom-
inance)); see also John T. Jost & Erik P Thompson, Group-Based Dominance and Opposition to 
Equality as Independent Predictors of Self-Esteem, Ethnocentrism, and Social Policy Attitudes 
Among African Americans and European Americans, 36 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 209, 
222–23, 229–31 (2000) (demonstrating for the first time that these concepts are related to one another 
differently for high- as opposed to low-status groups). 
 83 To appreciate how explicit biases might be operating here, it is helpful to distinguish between 
intentional discrimination on the basis of animus and discrimination on the basis of stereotype.  For 
the most part, black police officers will not harbor racial animus toward other African Americans.  
That is, blacks do not, on average, associate blackness with negativity and whiteness with positivity.  
See, e.g., Brian A. Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and Stereotypes, 
18 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 17 (2007).  This claim, however, can be understood fully only in 
context: whereas blacks on average do not show an implicit bias against their group, they also do 
not (on average) show an implicit bias toward their group.  Rather, they show no evaluative prefer-
ence at all, which contrasts them with whites, who show a strong implicit preference for their own 
group.  Id.  But, for some of the reasons we have already discussed, blacks may harbor racial 
stereotypes that could cause them both to use violence against other African Americans, on the one 
hand, and to legitimize the practice more generally, on the other.  All of this is to say that high-
SDO, low-status individuals will sometimes push back against systems that enhance hierarchy.  
However, there are reasons to think that this “push-back” dynamic may have little impact on the 
policing of black police officers. 
 84 See sources cited supra note 34.  One study of police officers found that an exception to the 
racial tension that existed between black and white officers was when they came to each other’s 
aid.  According to the author, police officers of both races “viewed the public as a common enemy.”  
THOMPSON, supra note 29, at 37. 
 85 See Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and 
Performance, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 613, 614 (1997); Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Ste- 
reotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 797, 797 (1995).  For an in-depth discussion of stereotype threat, see Richardson 
& Goff, supra note 25, at 124–28. 
 86 See Steele & Aronson, supra note 85, at 798. 
 87 E.g., PHILLIP ATIBA GOFF ET AL., PROTECTING EQUITY: THE CONSORTIUM FOR PO-
LICE LEADERSHIP IN EQUITY REPORT ON THE SAN JOSE POLICE DEPARTMENT 1–3 (2013). 
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that the more officers experience stereotype threat, the more likely they 
are to use greater force against black suspects relative to individuals of 
other racial groups, both in the lab and in the real world.88 
One of us has previously theorized that the reason stereotype threat 
is associated with greater uses of force against black civilians is because 
it influences officers’ perceptions of their moral authority, that is, their 
sense of self-legitimacy, and thus, their confidence that they can control 
a potentially threatening situation in noncoercive ways.89  After all, if 
officers believe that civilians do not respect their authority, they will be 
quicker to think that words alone will be insufficient to control the sit-
uation and be more likely to use physical force as a result.  In fact, one 
study found that when officers believed that civilians did not respect 
them and did not view them as legitimate, officers were more likely to 
believe that interactions with these individuals would be more danger-
ous.90  That finding is particularly problematic for African Americans.  
Because the “police-are-racist” negative stereotype is most salient with 
reference to black civilians, African Americans are more likely than any 
other group to generate stereotype threat in police officers,91 including 
officers who are black.92 
Recent research provides evidence to support this theory.  The study 
we have in mind involved 514 police officers from a large urban police 
department.93  Researchers found that officers’ perceptions of their own 
legitimacy is tied to their views of how citizens perceive them.94  The 
more officers experienced stereotype threat, the less likely they were to 
perceive themselves as legitimate.95  Furthermore, officers who experi-
enced stereotype threat felt less confident in their authority.96  Finally, 
the study found that the less legitimate officers viewed themselves to be, 
the more resistant they were to their department’s use-of-force policies, 
the more approving they were of unreasonable uses of force, and the less 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 88 Id. at 3. 
 89 Richardson & Goff, supra note 25, at 127–28. 
 90 Phillip Atiba Goff et al., Illegitimacy Is Dangerous: How Authorities Experience and React 
to Illegitimacy, 4 PSYCHOLOGY 340, 342–43 (2013). 
 91 Godsil & Richardson, supra note 5, at 2251–52.  
 92 GOFF ET AL., supra note 87, at 5 (observing that nonwhite officers frequently mentioned 
occasions when citizens of the same race accused them of racism). 
 93 Rick Trinkner & Phillip Atiba Goff, The Force of Fear: Police Stereotype Threat, Self- 
Legitimacy, and Support for the Use of Force 3 (2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
Harvard Law School Library) (citations omitted). 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 5. 
 96 Id. 
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supportive they were of using procedurally just policing tactics in inter-
actions with citizens.97  The officers’ race did not predict these experi-
ences of stereotype threat.98 
Importantly, researchers have not found significant differences be-
tween black and white officers’ experiences of stereotype threat.99  Since 
stereotype threat influences both black and white officers, simply having 
more diversity in police departments may not, in and of itself, reduce 
uses of force against black citizens. 
3.  Masculinity Threat. — Another phenomenon that may influence 
police officers regardless of their race is masculinity threat.  Masculinity 
threat refers to the fear of being perceived as insufficiently masculine.100  
Masculinities theorists have rejected the notion of gender as being 
simply about “biological” differences between sexes, focusing instead on 
gender as a social construct.101  Viewed this way, gender is not about 
one’s innate characteristics, but rather about performing societal expec-
tations of “what it means to be a man.”102  To put all of this another 
way, “[o]ne must learn to be a man in this society because manhood is a 
socially produced category.”103  Far from being an existential given, 
“[m]anhood is a performance.  A script.  It is accomplished and re- 
enacted in everyday relationships.”104  Precisely because men do not per-
ceive of their manhood or masculinity “as a developmental guarantee, 
but as a status that must be earned,”105 men often experience a kind of 
masculinity precarity, or what we have been calling masculinity 
threat.106  This sense of precarity is compounded to the extent that men 
work in hypermasculine environments, where exaggerated displays of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. at 5–6. 
 99 GOFF ET AL., supra note 87, at 5.  As Professor Phillip Goff notes, the study’s findings could 
be attributed either to the small sample size of nonwhite officers or to the concerns white officers 
may have had with admitting to a fear of being judged to be racist.  Id. 
 100 For an in-depth discussion of masculinity threat, see Richardson & Goff, supra note 25, at 
128–31. 
 101 Candace West & Don H. Zimmerman, Doing Gender, 1 GENDER & SOC’Y 125, 137 (1987); 
see also Richardson & Goff, supra note 25, at 128. 
 102 Deborah Kerfoot & David Knights, “The Best Is Yet to Come?”: The Quest for Embodiment 
in Managerial Work, in MEN AS MANAGERS, MANAGERS AS MEN 78, 86 (David L. Collinson & 
Jeff Hearn eds., 1996); see also Richardson & Goff, supra note 25, at 128. 
 103 Devon W. Carbado, Straight out of the Closet, 15 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 76, 93–94 
(2000). 
 104 Id. at 94. 
 105 Jonathan R. Weaver et al., The Proof Is in the Punch: Gender Differences in Perceptions of 
Action and Aggression as Components of Manhood, 62 SEX ROLES 241, 242 (2010). 
 106 Joseph A. Vandello et al., Precarious Manhood, 95 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1325, 
1335 (2008) (“When faced with feedback that they did not measure up to others of their gender, men 
(but not women) showed increased anxiety- and threat-related thoughts . . . .  Given that manhood 
is precarious, requiring action and success in all ‘manly’ endeavors, it is not surprising that many 
men feel anxiety over what they perceive as an unattainable standard.” (citations omitted)). 
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physical strength and aggression are glorified and rewarded as a means 
of demonstrating and maintaining one’s masculinity.  In those contexts, 
when a man’s masculinity is threatened, he will often respond with vi-
olence107 because “physical aggression is part of men’s cultural script for 
sustaining and restoring manhood.”108 
In police departments, “[h]ypermasculinity amongst the rank and file 
is encouraged, reinforced, and policed in numerous ways.”109  The de-
partments that do highlight gender diversity often do so in a manner 
that foregrounds women’s “outsider” status;110 some scholars have even 
posited that police academies have “an informal ‘hidden curriculum’ 
about masculinity,”111 wherein “[m]en learn[] to disparage women by 
verbally denigrating and objectifying them”;112 these academies also  
emphasize physical fighting and violence inside and outside the class-
room.113  Compounding all of this is the fact that policing is still a male-
dominated profession,114 and “police work is still viewed by police them-
selves and the public as a masculine pursuit best characterized by  
aggressive macho crime fighting.”115  Finally, “officer training continues 
to emphasize physical strength, danger, and the physical aspects of the 
job, all of which codes policing as hypermasculine.”116 
Against the backdrop of the gendered dimensions of the practices 
and perceptions of policing, male officers comment on the necessity of 
proving their masculinity through performance of a straight, macho 
identity.117  For instance, patrol officers may not call for help out of 
concerns that they will be viewed as insufficiently masculine in the eyes 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 107 See Jennifer K. Bosson & Joseph A. Vandello, Precarious Manhood and Its Links to Action 
and Aggression, 20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 82, 83 (2011); Angela P. Harris, Gen-
der, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 777, 784–85 (2000) (identifying this 
phenomenon in the instance of class dynamics); Vandello et al., supra note 106, at 1334. 
 108 Weaver et al., supra note 105, at 247. 
 109 Richardson & Goff, supra note 25, at 131; see also Michael F Aiello, Policing the Masculine 
Frontier: Cultural Criminological Analysis of the Gendered Performance of Policing, 10 CRIME, 
MEDIA, CULTURE 59, 59–60 (2014). 
 110 See Aiello, supra note 109, at 72–74.  Seven of the twenty-two departments studied overtly 
highlighted these gender differences.  Id. at 74; see also Richardson & Goff, supra note 25, at 132 & 
n.104. 
 111 Anastasia Prokos & Irene Padavic, “There Oughtta Be a Law Against Bitches”: Masculinity 
Lessons in Police Academy Training, 9 GENDER, WORK & ORG. 439, 440 (2002). 
 112 Id. at 452. 
 113 Id. at 449; see also Richardson & Goff, supra note 25, at 132. 
 114 Susan L. Miller & Emily Bonistall, Gender and Policing: Critical Issues and Analyses, in 
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 315, 316 (Walter S. DeKeseredy & 
Molly Dragiewicz eds., 2012). 
 115 Richardson & Goff, supra note 25, at 133 (quoting Miller & Bonistall, supra note 114, at 316). 
 116 Id. (first citing Jennifer Brown et al., Appropriate Skill-Task Matching or Gender Bias in 
Deployment of Male and Female Police Officers?, 3 POLICING & SOC’Y 121, 121 (1993); then citing 
Aiello, supra note 109, at 70–71). 
 117 See Susan L. Miller et al., Diversity in Blue: Lesbian and Gay Police Officers in a Masculine 
Occupation, 5 MEN & MASCULINITIES 355, 369 (2003). 
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of other officers.  As one veteran officer shares, “officers who ‘call for 
help’ are seen as weak, as vulnerable, and as feminine. . . . The subcul-
ture dictates that ‘real men’ will never need to call for help; those who 
do are often subjected to ridicule and scorn after having done so.”118  All 
of this helps to explain why male officers may feel vulnerable to their 
colleagues perceiving them as wanting in masculinity. 
Researchers have found that masculinity threat predicts uses of force 
by police against black men both in the lab and in the field.119  One 
study found that the more officers were insecure in their masculinity, 
the more likely they were to use greater force against blacks relative to 
other racial groups.120 
As a theoretical matter, there are reasons to think that black officers 
are not immune to the masculinity threat phenomenon we have de-
scribed.  Indeed, one might theorize that black officers have a stronger 
incentive than white officers to defend their masculinity (1) if they are 
subject to racism within their police departments,121 or (2) if they believe 
that their white or nonblack colleagues will think that they are prone to 
be “soft” on black suspects out of a sense of racial loyalty or kinship. 
As an empirical matter, at least one line of research indicates that 
black police officers experience masculinity threat at similar rates to 
white officers.122  Another line suggests that black officers may experi-
ence greater levels of masculinity threat.  Professors Kimberly Hassell 
and Steven Brandl, for example, found, in a study of over a thousand 
Milwaukee Police Department officers, that black officers were more 
likely than their white colleagues to report that their peers underesti-
mated their physical ability to do police work, an experience of doubt 
that has clear implications for masculinity.123  While research in the area 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 118 Thomas Nolan, Essay, Behind the Blue Wall of Silence, 12 MEN & MASCULINITIES 250, 
255 (2009). 
 119 GOFF ET AL., supra note 87, at 11 (referring to the phenomenon that we call “masculinity 
threat” as “male gender role stress”); see also Phillip Atiba Goff et al., Voices of Dominance, Deaf 
to the Death of the Dying Dehumanized (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Law 
School Library).  
 120 GOFF ET AL., supra note 87, at 11. 
 121 This is all the more likely given that being exposed to racism can cause black men to engage 
in compensatory performances of masculinity.  Phillip Atiba Goff et al., Racism Leads to Pushups: 
How Racial Discrimination Threatens Subordinate Men’s Masculinity, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1111, 1111, 1113 (2012). 
 122 PHILLIP ATIBA GOFF & KARIN DANIELLE MARTIN, UNITY BREEDS FAIRNESS: THE 
CONSORTIUM FOR POLICE LEADERSHIP IN EQUITY REPORT ON THE LAS VEGAS  
METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT 20–21 (2012), http://fliphtml5.com/sgkv/vlgl/basic/ 
[https://perma.cc/2Y9L-7HNQ] (finding no racial differences in responses to a masculine gender 
role stress scale). 
 123 Kimberly D. Hassell & Steven G. Brandl, An Examination of the Workplace Experiences of 
Police Patrol Officers: The Role of Race, Sex, and Sexual Orientation, 12 POLICE Q. 408, 417–20 
(2009). 
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of masculinity threat remains relatively new, the bottom line for our 
purposes is that the phenomenon likely impacts black officers. 
4.  Racial Solidarity Threat: A Version of Racism Stereotype Threat. — 
Black police officers may also experience a version of racism threat that 
we call “racial solidarity threat.”124  The notion is that black police in-
teractions with black men potentially threaten these officers’ sense of 
racial identity and kinship.  More precisely, the threat is that the black 
men with whom they interact will perceive black police officers to be 
“sellouts,”125 “Uncle Toms,”126 or people who disidentify with or disas-
sociate from other black people.127 
There are two reasons to posit that racial solidarity threat could en-
gender aggressive policing.  First, a black police officer could expect that 
black suspects, more than suspects of other races, should understand the 
difficult position in which black police officers find themselves.  These 
suspects should thus make their encounters with the black police officer 
go as smoothly as possible by performing a kind of surplus compliance.  
In the absence of such compliance, the black officer may feel a reduced 
sense of kinship with his racial group.  He may come to believe that the 
very fact that the black suspect is being noncompliant means that racial 
affinity or solidarity is doing no work and that the black suspect is in-
vested in giving the black police officer a hard time.  Under these cir-
cumstances, the officer would not be able to trade on a racially specific 
form of moral authority — same-race affinity or community.  He would 
thus — consciously or unconsciously — default to a more authoritarian 
form of engagement. 
Second, black officers could think that the reason the black suspect 
is giving the black officer a hard time is because the suspect believes 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 124 For arguments about the importance of racial solidarity in the context of the black community, 
see Stephen L. Carter, The Black Table, the Empty Seat, and the Tie, in LURE AND LOATHING: 
ESSAYS ON RACE, IDENTITY, AND THE AMBIVALENCE OF ASSIMILATION 55, 66–67 (Gerald 
Early ed., 1993), which argues that racial solidarity is essential for the professional success of the 
black community in modern America; and David B. Wilkins, Identities and Roles: Race, Recogni-
tion, and Professional Responsibility, 57 MD. L. REV. 1502, 1556–62 (1998). 
 125 For a thoughtful discussion of the politics of this term among the black community, see gen-
erally RANDALL KENNEDY, SELLOUT: THE POLITICS OF RACIAL BETRAYAL (2008), which 
details the suspicion of racial betrayal in the black community and examines its manifestations in 
contemporary politics and culture. 
 126 The phrase “Uncle Tom” is a derogatory term that refers to African Americans who betray 
the black community through their relationships with whites.  See Jacquelyn L. Bridgeman, Defin-
ing Ourselves for Ourselves, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1261, 1265–68 (2005).  See generally BRANDO 
SIMEO STARKEY, IN DEFENSE OF UNCLE TOM: WHY BLACKS MUST POLICE RACIAL LOY-
ALTY (2015) (tracking the historical development of the term “Uncle Tom” in black communities).  
 127 THOMPSON, supra note 29, at 44 (citing JOHN L. COOPER, THE POLICE AND THE 
GHETTO 116–19 (1980)) (“The competing demands of emotional separation versus the expected 
role of representing the ghetto community’s views thus caused black officers to eventually withdraw 
and turn their backs on racial peers just as Judas Iscariot was depicted in his betrayal of Christ.”). 
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that the black officer has in fact “sold out.”  This perception could en-
gender anger or frustration on the part of the black officer (particularly 
if the officer himself worries that he has “sold out”), either of which 
could produce more aggressive police conduct.  Although preliminary 
evidence suggests that black officers worry about being perceived as 
racist as much as white officers do,128 whether racial solidarity threat 
exists in the specific form we have described remains to be empirically  
determined.129 
C. “Fitting In” as Police Officers 
Even assuming that black police officers don’t have implicit or ex-
plicit biases against other African Americans and are not subject to the 
various “threats” we have described, there is a strong incentive for them 
to engage in various forms of racially motivated policing: to fit into the 
culture of their workplace.  Like other employees in workplaces, how 
black officers are perceived by their peers matters.  Indeed, within law 
enforcement, where cohesion and ability to work with one’s partner are 
emphasized as critical elements of effective policing,130 their peers’ per-
ceptions are likely to shape not only black officers’ experiences in the 
workplace but also their sense of legitimacy and authority as police of-
ficers.  Thus, it behooves black police officers to get along with their 
colleagues, to be good team players, and to fit into their work environ-
ment.  In short, black police officers have an incentive to “work their 
identities” to demonstrate that they belong.131 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 128 GOFF & MARTIN, supra note 122, at 17. 
 129 Black officers might experience even more threat when confronted by African American com-
munity members who make it known that they view the officer as a race traitor and a sellout, as in 
THOMPSON, supra note 29, at 43 (citing COOPER, supra note 127, at 111).  One study provides 
evidence of this: researchers found that when officers believed that civilians did not respect them 
and did not view them as legitimate, officers experienced concerns that interactions with these ci-
vilians would be more dangerous than interactions with civilians who they believed respected their 
authority and their legitimacy.  Goff et al., supra note 90, at 343.  
 130 See, e.g., Andrew Hawkes, Camaraderie on Patrol: A Recipe for Success, POLICEONE.COM 
(Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.policeone.com/police-jobs-and-careers/articles/4976250-Camaraderie-
on-patrol-A-recipe-for-success/ [https://perma.cc/8P6S-YWJB]. 
 131 Professors Devon W. Carbado and Mitu Gulati developed this theory on “working identity” 
in the context of theorizing workplace discrimination.  See DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, 
ACTING WHITE?: RETHINKING RACE IN “POST-RACIAL” AMERICA 21–45 (2013); Carbado & 
Gulati, supra note 6, at 1267–78. 
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But there are racial constraints on their capacity to do so that could 
lead them to engage in various forms of racially motivated policing.  In 
part, this bias derives from a potential tension that exists between a 
black officer’s sense of self and sense of his normative commitments, on 
the one hand, and his sense of what police cultures require, on the other.  
The effect of this tension is that race — the very thing that might lead 
one to surmise that black police officers can change the racial culture of 
policing — might limit their capacity to do so.  The schematic below 
provides an indication of what this tension might look like.132 
 Point One in the Model represents the black officer’s sense of self as 
a person with racial community ties and kinship who is committed to a 
progressive antiracist agenda.  At Point Two, the black police officer 
forms a view about the criteria his police department values: in this case, 
a racially targeted hard-on-crime sensibility.  At Point Three, the black 
police officer experiences a conflict between his sense of identity and his 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 132 This decision tree was first developed, though not in the context of police officers, in Carbado 
& Gulati, supra note 6, at 1267.  
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sense of the criteria that the institution values.  This conflict has to be 
negotiated.  This takes us to Point Four.  Here, the officer has to decide 
whether to compromise his sense of identity.  If he chooses not to do so, 
he will produce a performance that, from the perspective of what our 
hypothetical police department values, renders him a “bad cop” — a 
black police officer with a progressive antiracist/soft-on-crime identity.  
On the other hand, the officer may decide to compromise his sense of 
self.  Under the terms of the model, this would render him a “good 
cop” — that is, a black police officer with a hard-on-crime approach to 
policing. 
With the foregoing model in mind, and to make the discussion more 
specific, imagine that, while driving in a patrol car, a black police officer 
and a white police officer observe a car change lanes without signaling.  
Stipulate that the driver of the car is a black male in his twenties.  As-
sume that the white officer says to the black officer, “let’s go check things 
out.”  The black officer is inclined not to do so.  Because the officers had 
observed many white drivers commit traffic infractions and the white 
officer had not suggested stopping any of them, the black police officer 
experiences the white police officer’s “let’s go check things out” as an 
invitation to engage in racially targeted policing.  On the flip side, the 
black officer also believes that if he refuses to stop the black driver, his 
white colleague will perceive him to be racially conscious and soft on 
crime.  The officer is experiencing Point Three in the model — the con-
flict — and has to decide how to negotiate it (Point Four). 
The table below suggests that this conflict negotiation likely is a 
more salient dynamic than we have thus far discussed in that there are 
likely multiple moments of conflict between norms that a police depart-
ment might value and stereotypical perceptions about black police  
officers.133 
Table 2: Institutional Norms and Racial Stereotypes 
Institutional Culture/Norm Black Racial Stereotype 
Hard on crime Soft on crime 
Colorblind/Racially neutral 
Color conscious/ 
Racially sensitive or biased 
Qualified Unqualified 
Status quo oriented Anti-institutional 
Law abiding Law breaking 
Institutional loyalty Racial group loyalty 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 133 This table, too, is drawn from previous research on negotiating racial identity in the work-
place.  See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 131, at 36. 
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Cooperative institutional citizen 
Uncooperative institutional  
complainer 
Police (Blue-) centered identity Race (Black-) centered identity 
Trustworthiness (code of silence) 
Untrustworthiness (breaking  
code of silence) 
 
 As the table reveals, each institutional norm of our hypothetical po-
lice department is negatively associated with a stereotype about race.  
For example, the norm of law abidingness is positioned against the ste-
reotype of blacks as lawbreakers.  Similarly, the norm of cooperative 
institutional citizenship is positioned against the racial stereotype of 
blacks as uncooperative institutional complainers.  These oppositional 
dualities create an incentive for black police officers to align themselves 
with the norms that the institution values and signal that they do not 
have the qualities that are in opposition to those values.  This could lead 
black police officers to engage in racially targeted policing, not because 
they have implicit or explicit biases, but because of a pragmatic desire 
to survive, fit into, and thrive within a particular institutional setting — 
police departments.134 
One could imagine these dynamics affecting other officers of color 
for similar reasons.  Think, for example, about the kind of pressure a 
Muslim law enforcement official would feel to racially profile other 
Muslims in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.  Think as well about the 
pressures Latino border patrol agents must experience to racially profile 
people based on their “apparent Mexican ancestry.”135 
Elements of the model we have described have been substantiated 
by psychological research.  First, work by Professors Jenessa Shapiro 
and Steven Neuberg supports the idea that officers of color likely feel a 
conflict between their own values and those of the white majority, and 
that they may strategically express bias in order to gain esteem among 
white peers.  The researchers found that black men, more than white 
men, assumed that facially egalitarian white men were likely to hold 
unstated racial prejudice.136  Black men further expressed the belief that 
publicly matching white men’s presumed-racist views would be socially 
rewarded.137  Moreover, the researchers found that black men would 
engage in public displays of bias in contexts where they believed their 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 134 BOLTON & FEAGIN, supra note 29, at 193–95 (providing accounts of black officers who stood 
up to racial injustice being viewed as oversensitive, troublemakers, or radicals); id. at 202–04 (ob-
serving that black officers are reluctant to report brutality for fear of retaliation and ostracism). 
 135 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 877 (1975). 
 136 Jenessa R. Shapiro & Steven L. Neuberg, When Do the Stigmatized Stigmatize? The Ironic 
Effects of Being Accountable to (Perceived) Majority Group Prejudice-Expression Norms, 95 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 877, 881 (2008). 
 137 Id. at 882–83.  
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behavior toward a fellow person of color would be the basis of social 
evaluation by whites.138  In other words, though not specifically demon-
strated in a police population, this research suggests that blacks engage 
in precisely the kind of value comparison we describe in Point Two of 
the model, and further that the choice to engage in bias nonetheless 
(Point Four) represents a compromising of their true attitudes. 
Even more alarming, recent research suggests that racially biased 
policing by black officers seeking approval from white peers may in fact 
increase the expression of bias among white officers in the department.  
Professor Ines Jurcevic and colleagues have found that whites who ob-
serve a black person putting down a fellow black person will in turn 
derogate that target too.139  Using the ruse that participants would be 
helping on a hiring committee, the researchers showed white partici-
pants negative evaluations of a job applicant, ostensibly provided by a 
member of a hiring committee.140  They varied the race of the applicant 
as well as the race of the committee member and found that participants 
rated a black candidate more negatively after hearing a black committee 
member derogate him than after hearing a white committee member 
give an identical evaluation.141  In a follow-up study, they demonstrated 
the mechanism by which this occurred: hearing a black committee mem-
ber give a negative evaluation, it turned out, reduced whites’ concern 
about appearing prejudiced, which in turn predicted whites’ own 
(lower) ratings of the candidate.142 
While none of what we have said conclusively establishes that black 
police officers engage in racial profiling, at the very least the above cau-
tions against framing the problem solely with respect to white police 
officers.  Black officers and other officers of color likely racially profile 
as well.  They should thus figure more prominently in our discussions 
of the problem and the interventions we fashion to eliminate it. 
* * * 
Thus far, we have argued that explicit and implicit biases, a number 
of different “identity threats” — social dominance threat, stereotype 
threat, masculinity threat, and racial solidarity threat — and the pres-
sures black police officers likely feel to fit into their departments and the 
culture of “blue” may cause black police officers to police their own — 
that is to say, other African Americans — aggressively.  Below we add 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 138 Id. at 883–88. 
 139 Ines Jurcevic et al., Using Racial Minorities’ Opinions to Justify Prejudice Expression (June 
2014) (paper presented at the tenth biennial convention for the Society for the Psychological Study 
of Social Issues) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
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two additional factors: (1) the structure and organization of police de-
partments, including how those departments allocate work; and (2) the 
legal backdrop against which police officers act.  With respect to this 
second factor, our particular focus is on the Fourth Amendment.  As we 
will explain, Fourth Amendment law permits police officers to force in-
teractions with civilians with little or no basis.  Black police officers, 
and not just white police officers, likely take advantage of this power. 
D.  The Structure and Organization of Police Work 
Many people would be surprised to learn that police departments are 
sometimes run like businesses.  There are bottom lines, quotas, and 
benchmarks that must be met.  One of the most pernicious examples of 
this dynamic can be found in Ferguson, Missouri.  A DOJ investigation 
into Ferguson’s Police Department revealed that city officials placed 
enormous pressure on the police to generate revenue through their en-
forcement practices.143  In fact, the city made revenue generation the 
police department’s top priority, over and above public safety con-
cerns.144  Patrol officers were pressured to increase their “productivity” 
by writing more citations to enforce the municipal code.145  Supervisors 
monitored “productivity,” provided incentives to increase it, and made 
it one of the most important criteria for promotions.146  Moreover, addi-
tional officers were hired, and shifts were extended to increase opportu-
nities for municipal code enforcement.147  These practices occurred pri-
marily in Ferguson’s black neighborhoods.148 
Throughout the nation, policing has become a numbers game, with 
departments focusing their energies on the “objectification and quanti-
fication of police work.”149  In police departments across the country, 
officers are routinely evaluated and rewarded for the number of arrests 
they make, how many tickets they write,150 and how many stops and 
frisks they log.151  This type of proactive policing is typically carried out 
in indigent, minority neighborhoods.152 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 143 CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON  
POLICE DEPARTMENT 2 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/ 
attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5AFD-WEJV]. 
 144 Id. at 9–11.  
 145 Id. at 2, 10.  
 146 Id. at 11.  
 147 Id. at 10, 13–14.  
 148 Id. at 2, 16, 62–78.  
 149 JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCES-
SIVE USE OF FORCE 189 (1993); see also id. at 189–90. 
 150 Id. at 189–90. 
 151 See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 152 See id. at 602–03. 
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Recall that in his book, Forman highlights how violent crime rates 
led many African American leaders to embrace tough-on-crime 
measures, including proactive policing (pp. 202–14).  They were not the 
only ones to do so; on the contrary, those officials were trading on a 
much broader law-and-order impulse, the intellectual precursors of 
which were manifested, among other places, in a 1982 essay by  
Professors James Wilson and George Kelling titled Broken Windows: 
The Police and Neighborhood Safety.153  Kelling and Wilson argued that 
police could reduce major crimes by focusing on minor crimes that sig-
naled physical and social disorder such as public urination and drinking, 
loitering, and panhandling.154  The broken windows theory of policing 
captured the attention of police chiefs around the country.  In cities such 
as New York, trespassing, marijuana possession, and other low-level of-
fenses went from the least enforced to the most enforced criminal 
charges, especially in communities of color.155 
Officers quickly learned that enforcing low-level crimes in neighbor-
hoods of color would benefit their careers.  For instance, in a program 
known as “Operation Impact,” the New York Police Department 
(NYPD) assigned rookie officers to flood “hot spots,” which could some-
times consist of areas as small as a single housing project, in order to 
conduct stops, frisks, interrogations, and arrests.156  At the end of these 
officers’ shifts, they were evaluated on their arrest record and the num-
ber of citations they had issued.157  These rookies learned early on to 
engage in these policing practices as a means of moving up in the de-
partment.158  These pressures undoubtedly influenced rookies of all 
races. 
Indeed, in August 2015, twelve black and Latino police officers filed 
a class action lawsuit against New York City and the NYPD on behalf 
of minority police officers, alleging that the department forced them to 
carry out precisely the kind of arrest quotas we have described.159  They 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 153 James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29. 
 154 Id. at 29–30. 
 155 M. Chris Fabricant, War Crimes and Misdemeanors: Understanding “Zero-Tolerance” Polic-
ing as a Form of Collective Punishment and Human Rights Violation, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 373, 376–
77 (2011).  Scholars suggest that broken windows “policing is not about disorderly places, nor about 
improving the quality of life, but about policing poor people in poor places.”  Jeffrey Fagan & Garth 
Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 457, 457 (2000). 
 156 Fabricant, supra note 155, at 384. 
 157 Id. at 392–93. 
 158 See id. at 395. 
 159 Selim Algar & Josh Saul, NYPD Set Arrest Quotas for Minority Cops in Their Own Commu-
nities: Suit, N.Y. POST (Sept. 1, 2015, 1:59 PM), https://nypost.com/2015/09/01/cop-suing-over- 
minority-arrest-quotas-says-he-faced-retaliation/ [https://perma.cc/XFB3-8AES]; Knafo, supra note 
28. 
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claimed that an illegal quota system forced them to issue summonses 
“regardless of whether any crime or violation” had occurred and to focus 
disproportionately on areas in which minorities resided.160  The lawsuit 
also alleged that the predetermined “performance goals” were used to 
deny officers vacation, overtime, and career advancement.161  Edwin 
Raymond, the lead plaintiff in the lawsuit, claimed that the NYPD es-
sentially required officers to meet fixed numerical goals for arrests and 
court summons each month, a policy fundamentally discriminatory 
against minorities.162  The lawsuit asserted that commanders would use 
euphemisms such as “get more activity” or “be more proactive” to try to 
sidestep the quota ban that had been put in place.163  The amended 
complaint gave the example that “a police officer from a precint [sic] 
located in a predominantly white residential area will receive a positive 
evaluation while a police officer from a precint [sic] located in a pre-
dominantly minority area will receive a negative evaluation for the same 
exact number of enforcement actions.”164 
Although the city and NYPD explicitly denied such a quota, in 2017 
the city agreed to send out department-wide notifications to reiterate its 
policy that quotas were banned and that officers facing retaliation for 
failing to comply with quotas should notify the department’s Internal 
Affairs Bureau.165  NYPD Commissioner Bill Bratton also wrote in a 
2016 New York Daily News editorial that if the NYPD’s motivation to 
record enforcement encounters, issue summons, or effect arrests had 
ever been “driven by numbers and quotas, today’s NYPD is not.”166  
The lawsuit, Raymond v. City of New York, is still being litigated. 
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 160 Benjamin Weiser, New York City to Pay up to $75 Million over Dismissed Summonses, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2jR44V5 [https://perma.cc/GT25-RP2L]; see also Raymond 
v. City of New York, No. 15-CV-6885, 2017 WL 892350 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2017). 
 161 John Surico, A Former Cop Describes Racist Police Quotas in New York, VICE (Apr. 4, 2016, 
12:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/yvx8v7/a-former-cop-describes-racist-police-quotas-in-
new-york [https://perma.cc/RS2R-98GV].  
 162 Knafo, supra note 28. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Amended Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand at 12, Raymond, No. 15-CV-6885 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2015), ECF No. 31. 
 165 Weiser, supra note 160. 
 166 Bill Bratton, The NYPD: Winning the War on Crime, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 20, 2016, 4:00 
AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nypd-winning-war-crime-article-1.2502562 [https:// 
perma.cc/ZRP3-U5ZZ]; see also Conor Friedersdorf, The NYPD Officers Who See Racial Bias in the 
NYPD, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 7, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2015/01/the-
nypd-officers-who-see-racial-bias-in-the-nypd/384106/ [https://perma.cc/88FG-GZNS]; Rocco 
Parascandola & Thomas Tracy, NYPD Demands All Uniformed Officers Undergo “No Quota” Training 
for Arrests, Tickets, DAILY NEWS (Feb. 15, 2018, 8:24 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-
york/nypd-demands-uniformed-officers-undergo-no-quota-training-article-1.3823160 [https://perma. 
cc/68AG-2MP7]. 
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Supervisors also face enormous pressure to promote these proactive 
policing practices in minority communities.167  One primary reason is 
the managerial program known as CompStat.  Short for “compare sta-
tistics,” CompStat identifies areas of heightened criminal activity for 
targeted enforcement of quality-of-life offenses.168  In monthly 
CompStat, NYPD precinct commanders would be grilled and bullied 
on whether they were able to decrease crime in their jurisdiction.169  
These meetings are infamous for “excoriat[ing precinct commanders] 
over the crime numbers in their districts.”170  Because CompStat gath-
ered data on each unit and each officer in the city as well as tracked the 
number of stops and frisks, vertical patrols, arrests, and so on, it created 
enormous pressure on commanders to worry about the activity of every 
single officer within their department.171  Thus, managers and supervi-
sors put pressure on their officers to increase their productivity because 
managers’ promotions were also reliant on how well their precinct per-
formed.172  Again, these pressures existed regardless of the race of the 
individual manager. 
In sum, though the names of these policing strategies have changed, 
one common thread remains the same — they create incentives for of-
ficers who seek to rise within the ranks of their departments to over-
police African American communities.  Given our earlier point about 
the pressures black officers likely feel to fit into their departments, these 
officers may experience stronger incentives than white officers to proac-
tively police.  Whether we are right in this respect is less important than 
our broader takeaway — namely, that the structure and organization of 
police work shapes the policing of all officers, not just those who are 
white. 
The same is true of Fourth Amendment law.  Its impacts, too, trans-
cend the race of individual officers.  Like the organization and structure 
of police work, Fourth Amendment law creates conditions of possibili-
ties for police officers across races to aggressively police African  
American communities. 
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 167 For an example of contemporary policing practices in one major city, Boston, including 
CompStat, see Jeffrey Fagan et al., Stops and Stares: Street Stops, Surveillance, and Race in the 
New Policing, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 539, 543–44, 611–14 (2016). 
 168 Fabricant, supra note 155, at 375 (citing Adam Benforado, The Geography of Criminal Law, 
31 CARDOZO L. REV. 823, 860 n.144 (2010)); see also GRAHAM A. RAYMAN, THE NYPD TAPES: 
A SHOCKING STORY OF COPS, COVER-UPS, AND COURAGE 19 (2013). 
 169 RAYMAN, supra note 168, at 19–20. 
 170 Id. at 20; see also ELI B. SILVERMAN, NYPD BATTLES CRIME 97–124 (1999). 
 171 RAYMAN, supra note 168, at 23. 
 172 JOHN A. ETERNO & ELI B. SILVERMAN, THE CRIME NUMBERS GAME 109–21 (2012). 
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E.  The Legal Backdrop for Police Conduct 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits the government from engaging in 
“unreasonable searches and seizures.”173  Because of the narrow way in 
which the Supreme Court has interpreted this prohibition, however, 
Fourth Amendment law operates more as a source of police empower-
ment than as a meaningful constitutional constraint.174  More precisely 
for our purposes, consistent with Fourth Amendment law, police officers 
can make any of us — and certainly African Americans — feel insecure 
in our persons, houses, papers, and effects.  Consider, for example, the 
list one of us has compiled indicating the kinds of interactions that the 
Supreme Court has said are not seizures: 
Following a person 
Approaching a person 
Questioning a person along any of the following lines: 
 What’s your name? 
 What are you doing here? 
 Where do you live? 
 Where are you going? 
 What’s in your bag? 
 Do you have any drugs? 
 Are you an “illegal”? 
 Do you have ties to terrorism?175 
The fact that an officer follows a person onto a bus, or into a home, 
in order to ask some or all of the preceding questions would not change 
the analysis.  The Court would still conclude that those engagements do 
not rise to the level of a seizure.176 
The Court’s jurisprudence on what constitutes a seizure is important 
to foreground.  Police officers need no evidence of wrongdoing — none 
whatsoever — to engage in conduct that the Court concludes is some-
thing other than a seizure.177  In this respect, the greater the number of 
instances in which the Court concludes that police conduct is not a sei-
zure, the greater the forms of contact police officers, including African 
American officers, can make without any justification. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 173 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 174 Of course, the Fourth Amendment is not the only legal constraint on police conduct.  We focus 
on the Fourth Amendment to highlight dimensions of stop-and-frisk jurisprudence to which schol-
ars have paid insufficient attention. 
 175 See Carbado, supra note 9, at 132–49. 
 176 See id. at 135–37 (bus); id. at 139–44 (home, via “voluntary interviews”).  
 177 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 11 & n.5 (1968) (distinguishing between a limited stop and a 
seizure, and noting that “the right to stop and inquire is to be justified for a cause less conclusive 
than that which would sustain an arrest,” id. at 11 n.5 (quoting People v. Rivera, 201 N.E.2d 32, 35 
(N.Y. 1964))).  This logic applies to searches as well: police officers need no evidence of wrongdoing 
to engage in conduct that is not a search.  
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If the problem with Fourth Amendment law were only that it per-
mits police officers to perform the kinds of interactions we have de-
scribed without any evidence of wrongdoing, things would be bad 
enough.  But the reality is worse in that the Court’s conclusions about 
when searches and seizures are reasonable make it relatively easy for 
officers to justify them.  Below we elaborate on this point.  We pay 
particular attention to stops and frisks and the constitutional doctrines 
that underwrite both practices. 
* * * 
Fifty years ago, the Court in Terry v. Ohio178 held that officers could 
detain individuals and conduct a limited frisk for weapons based on 
reasonable suspicion.179  While Chief Justice Warren hoped that the 
standard would adequately balance individuals’ desires to be free from 
invasion against police officers’ desire to deal effectively with perceived 
threats,180 the standard has been more of a sword for police officers than 
a shield for civilians.181  Five reasons explain why.182 
First, reasonable suspicion is a low evidentiary bar that police offic-
ers can easily satisfy.  Thus, police officers end up having tremendous 
discretion with respect to deciding whom to subject to stops and frisks.  
Second, implicit and explicit biases likely shape how and when police 
officers of all races exercise that discretion.183  Third, assuming that an 
officer stops an individual, those very same biases will shape whether 
the officer interprets the person’s behavior as evidence that the individ-
ual could be dangerous or carrying a weapon; this might lead the officer 
to conduct a search that not only invades the individual’s privacy but 
also humiliates him publicly.184  Fourth, recall our earlier points con-
cerning identity threats.  Once a police encounter is staged, the sense of 
threat that both police officers and black people experience can feed off 
each other in ways that increase the likelihood that a particular officer 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 178 392 U.S. 1. 
 179 Id. at 30–31; see also Richardson, supra note 71, at 82.  
 180 The decision authorizes officers to conduct stops and frisks as long as they can “point to 
specific and articulable facts,” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, that “lead[ them] reasonably to conclude . . . 
that criminal activity may be afoot,” id. at 30, and that the individual with whom they are inter-
acting is “armed and dangerous,” id. at 27. 
 181 Devon W. Carbado, From Stop and Frisk to Shoot and Kill: Terry v. Ohio’s Pathway to Police 
Violence, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1508, 1537–42 (2017). 
 182 This analysis draws from work that each of us has done separately, and in particular relies 
on insights from a 2017 article by Dean Richardson.  For a fuller discussion of these systemic factors 
and how they influence police officers more broadly, see generally Richardson, supra note 71. 
 183 For a more complete articulation of some of the interaction between implicit biases and rea-
sonable suspicion, see Richardson, supra note 4, at 2059–72; and Richardson, supra note 71, at 75–
81. 
 184 Richardson, supra note 4, at 2080. 
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will conclude that a particular African American poses a risk of harm 
to the officer.  Finally, consistent with current Supreme Court doctrine, 
police officers across race can easily manufacture the very reasonable 
suspicion that should preexist their decision to stop and frisk a person. 
As a reminder, our overarching aim in this section is to suggest that 
the impact of the Terry regime on African Americans is more a function 
of the power that body of law allocates to police officers than the racial 
identity of police officers.  We elaborate below. 
1.  Implicit Bias and Reasonable Suspicion. — There are a number 
of ways in which implicit and explicit biases and reasonable suspicion 
interact to increase the likelihood that police officers will stop and frisk 
African Americans.  First, as a result of racial biases that suppose  
African Americans are both criminally suspect and dangerous, officers’ 
attention will be drawn more quickly to blacks than to whites.185  Sec-
ond, “the reasonable suspicion test actually permits, rather than pre-
vents, actions based upon racial hunches.”186  It does so by providing 
officers with the interpretive space to evaluate the ambiguous behaviors 
of black civilians as aggressive, violent, or suspicious.  (We will say more 
about this dimension of the doctrine later.) 
Third, while the reasonable suspicion standard requires officers to 
justify their suspicions by pointing to the “specific articulable facts” that 
formed the basis for their suspicion,187 courts, including the Supreme 
Court, have watered down that requirement to mean very little indeed.  
Because an officer can rely on an individual’s appearance and de-
meanor, as well as the neighborhood in which he is located, those factors 
can easily function as the rhetorical means through which implicit or 
explicit biases are both expressed and legitimized.  The end result is that 
reasonable suspicion can provide constitutional cover for both conscious 
and unconscious biases. 
2.  Reasonable Suspicion and Identity Threats. — The points we 
made earlier about identity threats also help to reveal the racially 
fraught dimensions of the Terry doctrine.  Consider, for example, ste- 
reotype threat.  During any given encounter, stereotype threat may cause 
both officers and individuals to exhibit behaviors that the other party 
will interpret as signs of danger, suspicion, or aggression.188  To appre-
ciate how this dynamic might arise, let’s focus first on the civilian’s sense 
of threat. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 185 Id. at 2062 (noting that implicit bias can cause officers to notice activity in black individuals 
that “go[es] unnoticed” in white individuals). 
 186 Id. at 2063. 
 187 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). 
 188 For a comprehensive discussion of how stereotype threat might influence police-citizen inter-
actions, see Godsil & Richardson, supra note 5, at 2247–53. 
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In the context of a police interaction, an African American civilian 
might worry that he will be the victim of police racism, leading him to 
anticipate harsh treatment or even excessive force being used against 
him.189  That person might also be concerned that the officer will per-
ceive him as a criminal because of the deeply entrenched black-crime 
stereotype discussed earlier.  Under these conditions, the black individ-
ual may go into the police interaction with a heightened sense of anxi-
ety.190  That sense of racial anxiety has cognitive and physiological ef-
fects.191  “It can cause individuals involved in interracial interactions to 
feel self-conscious, and to become hyper-vigilant” during these encoun-
ters.192  “Additionally, the stress of racial anxiety is associated with a 
variety of physiological responses including sweating, increased heart 
rate, facial twitches, fidgeting, and avoiding eye contact.”193 
Let’s turn now to the police officer’s sense of threat.  To begin with, 
the officer might interpret the black person’s behavioral manifestations 
of anxiety — fidgeting, eye-contact avoidance, and sweating — as signs, 
reasonable-suspicion signs, that the individual poses a threat.194  This is 
not at all farfetched.  After all, the very behaviors we have just described 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 189 Richardson, supra note 71, at 80; see TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: 
ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 139–65 (2002). 
 190 See Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup Violence: 
Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 
590 (1976) (finding that humans “tend to perceive what [they] . . . expect to perceive”); Charles G. 
Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subse-
quently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2098–99 (1979);  
Richardson, supra note 71, at 80. 
 191 See Jennifer A. Richeson & J. Nicole Shelton, Stereotype Threat in Interracial Interactions, 
in STEREOTYPE THREAT 231, 236–37 (Michael Inzlicht & Toni Schmader eds., 2012). 
 192 Richardson, supra note 71, at 78 (first citing Derek R. Avery et al., It Does Not Have to Be 
Uncomfortable: The Role of Behavioral Scripts in Black-White Interracial Interactions, 94 J. AP-
PLIED PSYCHOL. 1382, 1383 (2009); and then citing Jennifer A. Richeson & J. Nicole Shelton, 
Negotiating Interracial Interactions: Costs, Consequences, and Possibilities, 16 CURRENT DIREC-
TIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 316, 318–19 (2007)); see also Mary C. Murphy & Valerie Jones Taylor, The 
Role of Situational Cues in Signaling and Maintaining Stereotype Threat, in STEREOTYPE 
THREAT, supra note 191, at 17, 18–19; Richeson & Shelton, supra note 191, at 232–34, 236–37. 
 193 Richardson, supra note 71, at 79 (first citing Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Imaging Race, 60 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 181, 182 (2005); then citing J. Nicole Shelton, Interpersonal Concerns in Social 
Encounters Between Majority and Minority Group Members, 6 GROUP PROCESSES & INTER-
GROUP REL. 171, 178–79 (2003); then citing Sophie Trawalter et al., Predicting Behavior During 
Interracial Interactions: A Stress and Coping Approach, 13 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 
243, 244 (2009); and then citing id. at 252, 256).  
 194 Philip Atiba Goff & Rachel Godsil, The Moral Ecology of Policing: A Mind Science Approach 
to Race and Policing in the United States, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE ETHICS 348, 358 (Jonathan Jacobs & Jonathan Jackson eds., 2017) (citing Cynthia J. 
Najdowski, Stereotype Threat in Police Encounters: Why African Americans Are at Risk of Being 
Targeted as Suspects (2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas at El Paso) (on file 
with the Harvard Law School Library)). 
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are among the ones police officers are trained to interpret as suspi-
cious.195  That interpretation could lead the officer to effect “command 
presence,” a posture police officers are encouraged to assume in the face 
of a possible threat.196  More particularly, the officer might attempt to 
take control of the situation by exercising precisely the kind of domi-
nance we previously discussed.197 
But the officer’s show of dominance and control can compound the 
individual’s sense of anxiety and increase the likelihood that the indi-
vidual will challenge the officer’s authority.198  Any such challenge on 
the part of the individual could end up confirming the officer’s initial 
stereotypical view of the person as non–law abiding and dangerous.  
Through all of this, the officer may have no sense of the role he played, 
nor the role of background racial biases, including stereotypes, in pro-
ducing this recursive dynamic. 
The short of what we are saying is that (1) the ease with which police 
officers can satisfy reasonable suspicion, and (2) the potential for identity 
threats on the part of both the civilian and the officer create feedback 
loops and signals about racism, criminality, dangerousness, and author-
ity.  These loops and signals increase not only the likelihood of stop-and-
frisk contact between African Americans and the police, but also the 
possibility that those moments of contact will escalate into violence.  Ad-
mittedly, there are racial particularities to the identity-threat dynamics 
we have described (recall, for example, that black officers, but not white 
officers, will experience racial solidarity threat).  Put those to one side.  
Our broader point is that the recursive feedback loop between African 
Americans and police officers transcends the racial identity of the  
officers.199 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 195 See Lucy Akehurst et al., Lay Persons’ and Police Officers’ Beliefs Regarding Deceptive Be-
haviour, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 461, 467–68 (1996); Richard R. Johnson & Mark A. 
Morgan, Suspicion Formation Among Police Officers: An International Literature Review, 26 
CRIM. JUST. STUD. 99, 108 (2013); Richardson, supra note 71, at 80; see also Nick Jacobellis, How 
to Spot a Concealed Firearm, POLICE MAG. (Nov. 1, 2007), http://www.policemag.com/channel/ 
patrol/articles/2007/11/how-to-spot-a-concealed-firearm.aspx [https://perma.cc/F6AA-RY3X]. 
 196 L. Song Richardson, Police Racial Violence: Lessons from Social Psychology, 83 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2961, 2969 (2015) (quoting Cooper, supra note 71, at 674). 
 197 Cooper, supra note 71, at 674; see also Phillip Atiba Goff et al., Not Yet Human: Implicit 
Knowledge, Historical Dehumanization, and Contemporary Consequences, 94 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 292, 301–03 (2008); Richardson, supra note 71, at 80; Richardson, supra note 196, 
at 2969. 
 198 Jacinta M. Gau & Rod K. Brunson, Procedural Justice and Order Maintenance Policing: A 
Study of Inner-City Young Men’s Perceptions of Police Legitimacy, 27 JUST. Q. 255, 269–70 (2010). 
 199 One of us has observed elsewhere:  
Research confirms that racial anxiety can increase the likelihood that force will be used 
during an interaction.  In one study involving the police, researchers found that officers 
experience racial anxiety, regardless of their race.  They also discovered that the experience 
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3.  Promoting Negative Interactions and Constructing Suspicion. — 
Rather than constraining police behaviors, post-Terry doctrine allows 
officers to construct the very reasonable suspicion they require to justify 
seizing a person in the first place.200  The ostensible right of every citizen 
to avoid police contact so long as police do not have reasonable suspicion 
or probable cause201 rings hollow for people of color living in communi-
ties made up predominantly of racial minorities.  To appreciate why, it’s 
helpful to know that the Supreme Court has given police officers license 
to view an individual’s decision not to engage with an officer as suspi-
cious.202  The relevant case here is Michigan v. Chesternut.203 
In Chesternut, the Supreme Court found nothing problematic with 
officers’ pursuing people even in the absence of reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause.204  In that case, Chesternut ran away upon observing 
four officers in a patrol car; the officers pursued him (for an unspecified 
amount of time) until they established probable cause to arrest him for 
drug possession.205  Chesternut argued that the police had effectively 
seized him during the chase, doing so without either reasonable suspi-
cion or probable cause.206  The Court disagreed,207 opining: 
[T]he police conduct involved here would not have communicated to the 
reasonable person an attempt to capture or otherwise intrude upon respond-
ent’s freedom of movement. . . . While the very presence of a police car 
driving parallel to a running pedestrian could be somewhat intimidat-
ing, . . . [it] was not “so intimidating” that respondent could reasonably have 
believed that he was not free to disregard the police presence and go about 
his business.208 
Consistent with this decision, officers seem free to pursue individuals 
“based solely on a mere hunch of criminality.”209  Given all that we have 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
of racial anxiety predicted uses of force against black men.  The more officers were con-
cerned with appearing racist, the more likely they were to have used greater force against 
black individuals, relative to individuals of other racial groups, in the previous two years.   
Richardson, supra note 71, at 81 (citing GOFF ET AL., supra note 87, at 3–5, 11, 15–16). 
 200 For a fuller discussion, see Richardson, supra note 71, at 84–88. 
 201 City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53 (1999) (plurality opinion) (“[The] ‘right to remove 
from one place to another according to inclination’ [is] ‘an attribute of personal liberty’ protected 
by the Constitution.” (quoting Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900))). 
 202 See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (“Headlong flight — wherever it occurs — 
is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly 
suggestive of such.”).  But see Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983) (“[R]efusal to listen or 
answer does not, without more, furnish . . . grounds [for reasonable suspicion].”).  Royer’s asserted 
protection, however, is rendered all but meaningless in light of police officers’ wide latitude to iden-
tify other actions as purportedly “suspicious.” 
 203 486 U.S. 567 (1988). 
 204 Id. at 575–76. 
 205 Id. at 569. 
 206 Id. at 570. 
 207 Id. at 572–73. 
 208 Id. at 575–76 (citations omitted). 
 209 Richardson, supra note 71, at 86. 
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said about explicit and implicit biases, police officers will be more likely 
to pursue black civilians, rather than white civilians, when acting in the 
absence of reasonable suspicion or probable cause.210 
The problem is worse given the factors on which police officers may 
base their reasonable suspicion.  In Illinois v. Wardlow,211 officers were 
patrolling a so-called “high crime area” in search of criminal activity.212  
When officers noticed Wardlow running, they pursued him.213  While 
the Court did not quite rule that fleeing in a high-crime area gives rise 
to reasonable suspicion, it came quite close, expressly identifying “the 
relevant characteristics of a location” and “evasive behavior” as part of 
the reasonable suspicion determination.214 
Nothing in the above analysis changes if, prior to the civilian’s flight, 
the police did not have sufficient cause or suspicion to seize the civilian.  
Thus, in “high-crime neighborhoods,” officers can create the reasonable 
suspicion necessary to act on their racial hunches simply by goading 
people into fleeing.  Doing so is easier than you might think.  Exhibiting 
aggressive behavior, without more, may cause people to flee.  Ordering 
people to stop might cause people to flee.  And using lights and sirens 
to follow people walking down the street might cause people to flee.  
Obviously, this is not an exhaustive list.  The point is that, without much 
difficulty, officers can increase the likelihood that any particular person 
will flee.  The more aggressive their behaviors, the greater the likelihood 
that people will flee.  In and of itself, that’s one of the troubling dimen-
sions of Wardlow. 
The other is that, if a person runs away, then officers have effectively 
created reasonable suspicion to conduct a forcible seizure.  Recall that 
at the outset of the encounter, the officer did not have reasonable suspi-
cion and therefore could not have legally seized the person.  The officer 
created that reasonable suspicion by provoking the person into running.  
In sum, “in high crime neighborhoods, officers can easily transform their 
inchoate racial hunches into reasonable suspicion to conduct a seizure 
simply by engaging in aggressive shows of force that scare people into 
fleeing.”215 
For reasons alluded to in the preceding sections, officers’ ability to 
construct reasonable suspicion in this way is easier with black individ-
uals than white individuals.  Consider, for example, the fact that the 
phrase “high-crime area” is primarily used to describe urban, majority-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 210 See id. 
 211 528 U.S. 119 (2000). 
 212 Id. at 124. 
 213 Id. at 121–22. 
 214 Id. at 123–24. 
 215 Richardson, supra note 71, at 86. 
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minority neighborhoods.216  Which is to say, the designation is not  
typically based on objective measures but on the attribution of crimi-
nality to black and brown communities.217  Indeed, empirical evidence 
demonstrates that people view majority-black neighborhoods as more 
disordered than majority-white neighborhoods, whether or not those 
neighborhoods are otherwise similarly situated.218  
The history and contemporary realities of racialized law enforcement 
offer another reason why police officers may have an easier time devel-
oping reasonable suspicion for African Americans than white Ameri-
cans — because black Americans, from a young age, learn not to trust 
the police.219  Black people’s longstanding contestatory relationship with 
the police creates an incentive for them to avoid police contact alto-
gether.  Fleeing, of course, is one way for them to do so.  But against the 
backdrop of stereotypes of black criminality, fleeing reinscribes the per-
ception of black non–law abidingness.  As Justice Scalia put it, quoting 
Proverbs, “[t]he wicked flee when no man pursueth.”220 
Perhaps the solution, then, is for African Americans to walk rather 
than run away?  Presumably, there is nothing “wicked” about that.  And 
indeed, police officers may not, at least as a formal matter, draw an 
adverse inference from a person’s decision to walk (rather than run) 
away.  That, it’s fair to say, is the good news. 
The bad news is that if the individual chooses to walk away, the 
officer may follow him, even without evidence that the person has done 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 216 Lenese C. Herbert, Can’t You See What I’m Saying? Making Expressive Conduct a Crime in 
High-Crime Areas, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 135, 136 (2002); see also Ben Grunwald & 
Jeffrey Fagan, The End of Intuition-Based High-Crime Areas, 106 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2018) (manuscript at 44) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (concluding that the 
NYPD’s use of high-crime areas is “virtually uncorrelated with actual crime rates” and that “[t]he 
suspect’s race, the racial and socioeconomic composition of the area, and the identity of the officer 
are all stronger predictors of whether an officer deems an area high-crime than the actual crime 
rate itself”). 
 217 See Grunwald & Fagan, supra note 216, at 44. 
 218 Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma and 
the Social Construction of “Broken Windows,” 67 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 319, 330–33 (2004) (“[T]he 
contextual effect of racial composition is largely independent of the observer’s ethnicity.  Specifi-
cally, blacks were not significantly more or less likely than whites to view predominately black 
neighborhoods as high in disorder . . . .”  Id. at 332.); see also Richardson, supra note 71, at 86. 
 219 In fact, negative “[a]ttitudes toward the police begin crystallizing during adolescence when 
youths have greater opportunities for direct and indirect contact with officers . . . .”  Jamie L. Flexon 
et al., Exploring the Dimensions of Trust in the Police Among Chicago Juveniles, 37 J. CRIM. JUST. 
180, 181 (2009); see also Craig B. Futterman et al., Youth/Police Encounters on Chicago’s South 
Side: Acknowledging the Realities, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 125, 125–26.  And this distrust can be 
born not only of personal experience, but also through secondhand trauma.  For instance, one study 
found that when high school students simply “observed other youths [being] stopped and treated 
with disrespect,” they were less likely to trust police.  Flexon et al., supra, at 185–86.  The bottom 
line is that while fleeing from police on the part of African Americans is completely consistent with 
innocence, the Terry doctrine permits police officers to draw an adverse inference from the practice. 
 220 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 623 n.1 (1991) (quoting Proverbs 28:1 (King James)). 
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something wrong.  Remember: following a person is not considered a 
seizure.  In other words, when a police officer follows you, you are tech-
nically free to ignore the officer and go about your business.  You are, 
in the parlance of Fourth Amendment doctrine, “free to leave.”221  At 
the same time, the officer is free to follow and even question you!  That 
is the meaning of Fourth Amendment freedom. 
This logic of ostensible freedom also, as we have discussed, applies 
when the officer’s decision to follow you takes the form of a chase.  Here, 
too, you are technically free to leave — in this instance by running away.  
Recall, though, that if you are fleeing in a high-crime area, the officer 
ends up having what he did not have at the outset of the interaction: 
reasonable suspicion.  Armed with reasonable suspicion, the officer is 
now legally empowered to seize and possibly even frisk you.  When one 
adds the fact that officers are more likely to use physical force against 
black individuals after a chase,222 it becomes clear that the Terry regime 
exposes African Americans not only to being stopped and frisked by the 
police, but also to being shot and killed by the police.223 
As we have already said and want to repeat here, black police offi- 
cers are potentially — even likely — implicated in the doctrinal state of 
affairs we have described.  Our analysis of the racial boundaries of Terry 
v. Ohio and its progeny is not first and foremost about white police of-
ficers.  That is to say, our aim has been to highlight police power, not 
the racial identity of police officers.  When one incorporates into our 
discussion of Terry our earlier points about implicit biases, identity 
threats, and the organization and structure of policing, the vulnerability 
of African Americans to police contact and violence — including at the 
hands of black police officers — is put into even sharper relief. 
CONCLUSION 
This brings us back to a central theme in Forman’s book — namely, 
that diverse governance is not necessarily enough to disrupt patterns of 
inequality.  We’ve advanced that claim vis-à-vis the racial dimensions 
of policing.  We have done so because it is critically important to  
intervene in the debate about the racial diversity (or lack thereof) of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 221 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 
429 (1991). 
 222 See Chris Mooney, The Science of Why Cops Shoot Young Black Men, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 
1, 2014, 11:00 AM), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/12/science-of-racism-prejudice/ 
[https://perma.cc/84RW-9F43]. 
 223 See Carbado, supra note 181; see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 127 n.1 (2000)  
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The resentment engendered by [this] intru-
sion is aggravated, not mitigated, if the officer’s entire justification for the stop is the belief that the 
individual is simply trying to avoid contact with the police or move from one place to another — 
as he or she has a right to do (and do rapidly).”). 
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police officers given that one of the solutions people continue to proffer 
for police officers’ racial profiling of and violence against African  
Americans is the diversification of police departments.224 
At the same time, we should be perfectly clear to note that we are 
not arguing against efforts to diversify the police.  Our point is that it 
would be a mistake to stop there.  As we have explained, there are 
broader factors, factors that transcend the racial identity of police offi- 
cers, that explain the exposure of African Americans to police contact 
and violence.  We will not in this conclusion even gesture in the direction 
of articulating our own solution to a problem whose history is rooted in 
perhaps the most pernicious system of racial inequality — slavery.225  
Instead, we will conclude by noting that just as the diversity rationale 
has not ended racial inequality in the context of education,226 the rede-
ployment of the rationale in the context of policing will not fundamen-
tally change how African Americans experience the police.  Which is to 
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say, whether or not police officers are policing their own, if the broader 
structural forces we have discussed remain the same, the racial dimen-
sions of policing with which the nation continues to grapple are likely 
to persist. 
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